Behind the scenes with Bremer during his contentious time in Iraq

My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, By L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, Simon & Schuster, 417 pp, illustrated, $27

Paul Bremer, the former senior American official in Baghdad, is in a hurry to establish his bona fides as a tough guy in a tough place. His first sentence in ''My Year in Iraq" is: ''Baghdad was burning." His by-now-famous tan Timberland boots, dark suit, and tie formed an indelible picture wherever he plunked himself in the hot, dusty country.

Bremer's story, written with former Foreign Service officer Malcolm McConnell, is a comprehensive look at how recent nation-building in Iraq was guided by democratic principles but subject to ad hoc adaptation. At one point, a ruling sheik told Bremer: ''Through the decades, we have always shown our loyalty. . . . If we should ever decide to betray you, I pledge my word that we will give you a month's notice."

The book is at least as much about a Washington insider trying to clarify the record as it is about building a ''future of hope" in Iraq. There's nothing mean or vicious about that; it's the way the political world works. Andrew Card, President George W. Bush's chief of staff, is quoted as telling Bremer: ''I've got the impression that people in Washington are 'gaming' you." Bremer himself tells the president, ''Frankly, I'm concerned that a lot of the Pentagon's frenetic push on the political stuff is meant to set me up as a fall guy."

It's clear there was little love lost between Bremer and his boss, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld resented Bremer's unwillingness to stay within Defense Department reporting protocols. Bremer more than once argued in favor of a Rand Corporation suggestion to have 500,000 troops on the ground ''to stabilize postwar Iraq." When he sent the report to Rumsfeld, suggesting he consider it, Bremer writes, Rumsfeld did not reply. Later, Rumsfeld told Bremer: ''Look, it's clear to me that your reporting channel is now direct to the president and not to me."

Bremer puts an end to a question about whether he dissolved the Iraqi Army without the president's knowledge. In his recent book ''State of War," New York Times reporter James Risen writes that ''the most fateful decision of the postinvasion period -- the move by American proconsul L. Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army -- may have been made without President Bush's advance knowledge, according to a senior White House source. The action, almost certainly coordinated with Rumsfeld, contradicted the recommendations of an interagency planning group chaired by the National Security Council."

In his book, Bremer says that he wrote a memo to Rumsfeld in May 2003 ''detailing our recommendations for the dissolution of the Iraqi Defense Ministry and its 'related entities.' . . . Later that day, when Rumsfeld authorized me to proceed, I informed the president of the plan in a video teleconference." Thus, it seems that Risen was correct: Bush did not make the decision.

Another hurdle for the administration, according to Bremer, was Washington's bureaucratic inability to meet important goals on time in Iraq. Despite his appeals, staffing and technology needs went unfilled for long periods.

Bremer suggests throughout that he is a can-do guy with heart, empathizing with his lonely wife and expressing disgust at what was done by Hussein's soldiers in the killing fields of Al-Hillah.

But at times Bremer sounds like a pedant, a bit like Lord Curzon in India, as in his recollection, ''Running through my mind this first morning in Baghdad was the much-quoted remark from 19th-century Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke, 'No battle plan ever survives the first contact with the enemy.' "

Ambassador Bremer also has a viceroy's ego. He writes: ''But there is no quick, easy path to renewing a society like Iraq's, recovering from decades of brutality. We must honor [the sacrifices of the American armed forces] by showing the patience and determination to finish the job." One might be pardoned for asking who is doing the finishing here. Is it the Iraqis, with coalition help? Is it the coalition (largely the United States), with backup from hesitant Iraqi combatants? There is an unmistakable diplomatic ambiguity about Iraq's ''future of hope."

In his acknowledgments, Bremer thanks first, at some length, his agent, followed by his collaborator, his editor, and then the troops. It is good to see the combatants get a touch of credit. A better editor might have helped this seasoned diplomat re-create and recount this episode of his distinguished career with less ego and more candor.

Michael D. Langan is a retired Treasury enforcement official. He served as a senior expert with the UN Monitoring Group on the Taliban and Al Qaeda.