AMID GLOBAL concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, Russia's delivery of nuclear fuel rods to the Islamic Republic might seem alarming on its face. Yet the move is unlikely to increase the danger that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. The fuel for the Russian-built Bushehr reactor will be under International Atomic Energy Agency controls, and the depleted rods will be returned to Russia.
And by demonstrating Iran can rely on nuclear fuel from abroad, Russia may deprive Iran of its central argument for having to enrich its own uranium on its own soil. This would be a considerable benefit for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and for stability in the world's most conflict-ridden region.
Despite outside criticism, Russia has, in its own way, stayed within an international consensus that Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. Russia has refused since March to complete work on Bushehr, though this never directly impinged on Iran's nuclear enrichment activities.
Still, the suspension helped Russia in other ways. By leaving the final 5 percent of its contract for the reactor unfulfilled, the Kremlin sent two messages. First, during a period when President Vladimir Putin frequently berated the Bush administration for acting unilaterally, the suspension of work on Bushehr told Washington that Russia was willing to apply nonmilitary pressure on Iran.
The other message - to Tehran - was that Russian foreign policy will promote Russia's interests alone. Iran's attempt to link final payments for Bushehr to a Russian veto of Security Council sanctions on Iran only provoked Putin. Bursts of rhetorical bravado from Iran's hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, added to Putin's desire to throw Tehran a brush-back pitch.
But now that payments for Bushehr are being made and nuclear fuel rods are being delivered from Russia, the stage may be set for a deal. Iran could be guaranteed a supply of nuclear fuel for civilian power plants in exchange for stopping efforts to enrich uranium that it could eventually use in nuclear weapons. In the past, Iran has argued that it cannot depend on any outside power or international consortium to provide nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. But that argument is in bad faith, and the Russian example vitiates it. This is what President Bush meant Monday when he observed: "If the Iranians accept that [Russian] uranium for a civilian nuclear power plant, then there's no need for them to learn how to enrich."
The time has come for Bush to present Iran with America's best offer, not only for internationally guaranteed nuclear fuel but also for security and economic integration into the global economy. Iran's theocrats can have nuclear power, security, and prosperity, or they can have their own source of enriched uranium. Not both.
