A postwar post-mortem
THE SHORT but vicious war in the Caucasus this week between Georgia and Russia appears to be winding down. Although Russian troops have yet to quit Georgian territory, it is not too soon to draw lessons from what went wrong and to apply those lessons in policies designed to prevent similar conflicts.
Murky as the genesis of the war may be, there is little doubt that the czar-like decider in Russia, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, was implementing a preexisting strategy. Putin is determined to reassert Russia's dominance over former Soviet republics that are today independent countries on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
Given how overt the Kremlin's aims are, the fiery nationalist president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, blundered grievously when he responded to small-scale violence from local separatists in South Ossetia by sending Georgian troops to shell and assault the breakaway region's capital city. Saakashvili had to know the Kremlin was eager for just such an excuse to punish him for his efforts to take Georgia into the NATO military alliance. He didn't merely fall into Russia's trap; he leaped in headfirst.
How did President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice fail to see the danger in the combination of Russia's strategy and Saakashvili's bravado? And why were they not able to prevent Saakashvili from taking actions that have damaged the interests of the United States and its European allies? Their failure to exercise timely influence on Russia - a major power that can be both rival and partner - and on Georgia - a tiny ally utterly dependent on Washington's patronage - is sure to have serious consequences.
This is a failure that will haunt Bush's successor. Ukraine must now worry that Russia will eye the Crimea next, a region of Ukraine where Russia's Black Sea fleet has long had crucial port facilities. Investors who were prepared to finance a natural gas pipeline across Georgia, which would prevent the Kremlin from exercising a monopoly over the delivery of natural gas to Europe, may be scared away. Inevitably, a cloud will be cast over prospects for Russian cooperation in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And divisions over Russia policy within the European Union are bound to be exacerbated.
The postwar challenge will be to preserve Georgian independence from Russia while allowing the separatist populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia some form of self-determination. And the Western democracies will have to draw some bright red lines for Putin without plunging the world into a new Cold War. 