Seven years later

SEVEN YEARS have passed since a terrorist plot hatched in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan produced the atrocities of Sept. 11. Soon after, fast-moving American forces accompanied by Afghan fighters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance chased the Taliban hosts of Osama bin Laden from power. But like a recurring nightmare, the Taliban have come back, waging vicious guerrilla warfare from their sanctuary, now in Pakistan.

The Taliban revival raises critical questions about the Bush administration's failure to capture bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001; to disarm the militias of Afghan warlords and employ young militiamen in rebuilding Afghanistan's war-blasted infrastructure; and to do something about the opium crops that largely fund the Taliban.

The shifting around of combat forces that President Bush announced Tuesday will not overcome those failures. As Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has said, the removal of 8,000 troops from Iraq and the dispatch of about 4,500 to Afghanistan in January amounts to "tinkering around the edges" and "kicking the can down the road to the next president."

Obama is right about that. But he is less persuasive when saying there are still "not enough troops, and not enough resources, with not enough urgency" in Afghanistan.

There may be a case for expanding the military effort in Afghanistan, where more than 50,000 United States and NATO troops are now operating. But that case must be made in conjunction with a comprehensive project for the political, economic, and social rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The history of that country is littered with failed foreign interventions. More American bombing and missile attacks on Afghan villages where unreliable informants have said Taliban fighters are hiding will only turn the population against the foreigners.

Similarly, Obama should reconsider his earlier pledge to strike at "high-value al Qaeda targets" inside Pakistan. Killing a few al Qaeda leaders will hardly eradicate the terrorist threat. Killing them on Pakistani soil can boomerang against US interests.

John McCain has been no more reassuring. In a speech two month ago, he called for a replication in Afghanistan of the counter-insurgency tactics that have worked in some areas of Iraq. His assumption that the Iraq counter-insurgency model can be transferred to Afghanistan ignores the great political, ethnic, geographic, and sectarian differences between the two countries.

Obama and McCain both need to revise their plans for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Above all, the next president must enlarge the circle of allies among the populace as well as the leadership of both countries.