New tack with the Taliban

NOTHING QUICK or dramatic may come of the tribal council attended by 50 Afghan and Pakistani political and tribal leaders this week in Islamabad. Still, the very fact of the meeting, or jirga, and its promise of "a dialogue with opposition groups" suggest a promising change of attitudes on both sides of the world's most conflict-ridden border.

Most encouraging was the recognition that Pakistan and Afghanistan share an interest in countering what the attendees called militancy and terrorism. "The destinies of Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely interlinked, and the peace and stability in one is sine qua non for peace and stability in the other," said the Islamabad Declaration released at the council's conclusion.

It was not always thus. Pakistan's intelligence agency sponsored the Taliban in the mid-1990s. And until recently, the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai held Pakistan responsible for permitting Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to enjoy a safe haven on the Pakistani side of the border. So this week's get-together is a necessary new stage in the struggle to cope with a growing Taliban threat to both countries.

On the Pakistani side, two recent developments account for the new interest in cooperation. The first was the election of a civilian government led by secular politicians who are not tied to the Taliban, as some officers of the intelligence service and the army have been. A second, and perhaps more compelling, cause of the new stance is an acute economic crisis in the country. Simultaneous with the jirga, Pakistani negotiators were begging the International Monetary Fund for billions in loans to meet otherwise unpayable debts.

The Karzai government and its US backers are wisely exploring the possibility of co-opting those Taliban elements that are not irreconcilable. This effort is based on a realization that no purely military elimination of the Taliban threat can be achieved any time soon. Moreover, the insurgent forces are hardly uniform or united; a number of local commanders have indicated they are open to switching to the government side under the right conditions.

The best way of reducing the Taliban threat to manageable proportions is to divide and conquer: Pull independent local commanders away from the fanatical true believers of the Taliban, and subtract as many tribal groups as possible from the orbit of Al Qaeda. If successful, this is the strategy most likely to accommodate the interests not only of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States, but also of more indirectly concerned countries such as India, Russia, and Iran.