The new era in Iran
EVEN IF Iran’s rulers clear the streets by killing and beating citizens protesting a fraudulent election, they cannot undo the damage done to their political system. Millions of Iranians, women and men alike, called the democratic claims of the regime a lie. By their panicky reactions, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad betray an awareness that they have lost whatever legitimacy they once had.
The unforeseen drama in Iran presents President Obama with a challenge and, perhaps also, an opportunity. Obama had properly made opening a dialogue with Iran a national-security priority. The ultimate aim was to forge an agreement that would keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Any such accord would likely entail a grand bargain encompassing security guarantees for Iran, US-Iranian cooperation on regional issues, and Iranian access to much-needed Western investment and technology.
To keep open the possibility of such an accord, Obama practiced restraint in his initial responses to the aftermath of Iran’s June 12 presidential election. The wisdom of that stance was confirmed last week when Ahmadinejad pounced on the opportunity to castigate Obama for his recent, harsher statements, comparing him to George Bush, warning him to “avoid interfering in Iran’s affairs,’’ and insolently commanding him to “express your regret in a way that the Iranian nation is informed of it.’’
The problem for Ahmadinejad is that he has blatantly lost the right to speak for the Iranian nation. He can pretend that he has a stronger mandate than ever, but Iranians and the rest of the world know better. They have witnessed a mass revolt against Ahmadinejad and his ruling circle of Revolutionary Guard commanders and security bosses. That revolt, in its slogans, sounded like a revolution against the Islamic Revolution. Night after night, Iranians went to their rooftops and shouted the old slogans of the 1978-79 rebellion against the shah: “Death to the Dictator’’ and “God is Great!’’
Obama must now craft a strategy to cope with an Iran riven by two overlapping internal conflicts: one between the masses and the regime, and another that pits Ahmadinejad’s belligerent coterie against more flexible senior clerics and politicians.
Obama will have to remain focused on removing the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. Toward that end, he should repeat publicly and privately the American interest in a dialogue with Iran. If Khamenei and Ahmadinejad decide they can retrieve some legitimacy by striking a bargain with Washington, the suppressed uprising of Iranians will have had a positive effect. If not, Iranians will know whom to blame for the isolation their country will suffer. 