Diplomacy in word and deed
SENATOR BARACK Obama's overseas trip was largely designed to make him appear presidential domestically and internationally, and overcome skepticism, particularly among independent voters, as to his preparedness in foreign policy. Avoiding rhetorical missteps or policy errors was a key concern, as was providing the diplomatically correct and responsible rhetoric, sufficient enough to distinguish himself from Senator John McCain, but not deviating or implying any radical departure from mainstream policies. In fact, throughout the trip any substantive differences in foreign policy between the candidates diminished even further.
America's allies wanted Obama to reassure them of America's commitments, particularly in Europe. However, neither Obama nor McCain is likely, or able, to drastically change the fundamentals of the relationship since much of it remains institutionalized in formal treaties, rules-based structures and collective interests. The future relationship will be largely determined beyond the purely bilateral realm. It is here where the candidates have more flexibility to shape a new paradigm for the 21st century that reflects common transatlantic values, aspirations, and interests.
On Iraq, both Washington and Europe accepted long ago that Iraq is a US responsibility, though a regional and global concern, and will not include substantial European involvement, particularly since public opinion remains hostile.
In Afghanistan, the need for greater European commitment and resources is fundamental to the operation's success. The next US president can influence the European debate if he is able to effectively communicate and convincingly explain the implications of failure in Afghanistan to European publics. Thus far, European leaders have failed to do so. Furthermore, the negative impact of the Iraq war on European public opinion has rendered many unable to distinguish between Iraq and Afghanistan.
Despite Germany's assurances to increase its troops by 1,000 to a total of 4,500, Berlin won't send them into combat in Afghanistan's hostile south. Behind this policy is a pacifist political culture averse to armed conflict. Chancellor Angela Merkel's most important immediate concern remains winning the next election, which will likely pit her against the current foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Debate over Afghanistan will be critical. Furthermore, opposition to military action against Iran is largely unanimous across the German political spectrum. For Berlin, the diplomatic process remains the only option and no US president can change this.
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France does not face presidential elections for another four years but his disappointing first year in power has complicated his ability to maneuver. He is using foreign policy as a means to reseize the political initiative. He has laid down a fairly pro-US stance, marked by an increase in French troops in Afghanistan and a decision to eventually rejoin NATO's military command structure, which France left in 1966. However, even a pro-US French president has his limits. Direct combat by French forces in Afghanistan and venturing beyond the diplomatic process on Iran would trigger a popular backlash.
Although the United Kingdom remains America's closest ally in Europe, Prime Minister Gordon Brown is the weakest of Washington's major European allies. His disastrous first year in power defied high expectations and resulted largely from self-inflicted miscalculations. Last week's loss of a traditional Labor seat in Glasgow led to renewed calls for his resignation. The use of foreign policy to offset his weak domestic position will yield limited results. In a recent speech to the Israeli parliament, Brown said Britain was determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons but did not make clear his position on a military strike. Furthermore, Brown's policy on Iraq and Afghanistan is coming under increasingly intense scrutiny as the British military feels the effects of over-extension. Despite an announcement of further reduction of British forces in Iraq, increasing casualties in Afghanistan's war-torn south are further complicating his tenuous position.
The next US president will have to deal with the limitations imposed by these realities. Undoing eight years of President Bush's foreign policy is far more difficult than Obama's rhetoric portrays or his supporters would like to realize or admit. Sound-bite diplomacy and creating a standard shopping list of foreign policy priorities may help win an election but will not ensure the national interest. Working assiduously with allies to counter evolving global threats will help determine success for the next president.
Marco Vicenzino is director of the Global Strategy Project in Washington, D.C. 