Georgia's wary protectors

NEARLY 300 years ago, in eastern Georgia, King Vakhtang VI ruled over a petty kingdom dominated by the Persian empire. The king longed to be free of Persia, and so he looked further afield for great power protection.

It happened that Russia, under Peter the Great, was expanding its reach at the expense of Persia, which was no longer the power it once was. Peter sounded out the Christian kingdoms under Persian dominion, and encouraged them to align themselves with the new superpower. Vakhtang was thrilled at Peter's overtures, especially since he stood to gain kingship over the Christian nations under Persian control.

Vakhtang's viziers warned him not to move too aggressively. Peter might not come to Georgia's rescue. "How can a Christian emperor fail a Christian king?" Vakhtang reasoned. They advised him to meet with Russia's envoys in secret. Vakhtang replied: "How can I hide our ancient Christian banner?"

Not only did Vakhtang engage Peter's envoys openly, he attacked a border province with 40,000 Georgian troops and then waited for Peter to come to his rescue. Peter, however, never showed up. The Persians counterattacked with a vengeance and overran Vakhtang's kingdom.

If you substitute democracy for Christianity, you have a parallel situation today with the Bush administration as the protector who was not really in a position to protect.

How could President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia not have thought the United States would have to stand by his country even if it did attack? After all, is Bush not the great defender of democracy as Peter set himself up to be the defender of Christianity? Doesn't the Bush administration use democracy promotion to expand its power as Peter used Christianity?

What if Bush's vizier, Condoleezza Rice, and others did caution Saakashvili in private? Did she not stand beside him and swear undying support in public? Had not Georgia's army been American-trained, and had not the Americans conducted joint military exercises with the Georgians only the month before the conflict with Russia began? And in an administration famous for mixed signals, who knows what other of Bush's viziers undermined Rice's warnings?

According to Levan Gigineishvili, a professor at Chavchavadze Tbilisi State University and my informant on Georgian history, the modern situation was exacerbated by the lack of checks and balances in Georgia's flawed democracy. "Decisions were taken without much, if any, public and parliamentarian discussions and debates, almost in a monarchic fashion," he writes. After the "Rose Revolution" in 2004, the motto was first a strong state, then democracy, so Parliament's powers were curtailed to broaden those of the president.

Of course Saakashvili's miscalculation played right into Russia's hands as Vakhtang's played into Persian hands, a story that every Georgian child is taught.

The great mystery is how, with American military advisers on the ground, American intelligence could have been taken unawares? The first reports claimed that the Georgian Army slipped away without Americans noticing. This stretches credulity, and one day the whole story may be told.

The greater American miscalculation was believing that Russia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, was so weak that the West could ignore all its warnings and security concerns, and ride roughshod over its interests with impunity. To create a client state prone to belligerency and foolhardiness on Russia's border appears to have been reckless. Any talk of taking Georgia into NATO should be postponed indefinitely.

Russia has gained in power and influence in the last eight years, while under the Bush administration America's standing has declined. For the Bush administration to say that invading countries and changing borders is unacceptable in the 21st century is risible, given Iraq and Kosovo.

The West is fumbling over what price Russia should pay for its hideous overreaction, but in the end it is Russia that loses by hindering its integration with the West and the collective hostility of its neighbors.

Henry Kissinger told Republicans last week that his goal with the Russians when he was secretary of state was "not to democratize them, but to normalize them." It is going to be a lot harder than it would have been before Saakashvili's folly and Vladimir Putin's aggression, but it's not a bad goal for the next administration.

H.D.S. Greenway's column appears regularly in the Globe.