Bioterrorism - a preventable catastrophe

IN MAY 2002, I visited Pokrov, a largely abandoned Soviet-era agricultural research center east of Moscow. Originally established to produce vaccines for animals, Pokrov became a laboratory for biological weapons, especially anthrax, in the final years of the Cold War.

We entered the building, which stored samples of all the materials produced at Pokrov. The woven wire and electrified fence that at one time had secured the building was a fallen, rusting heap. The security alarm to the main entrance had been turned off and the door was ajar. Up two flights of steel-grate stairs were the storage rooms, two tennis court-sized rooms filled with commercial refrigerators. Several refrigerators had two common features: note cards listing the materials inside, and flimsy strings encircling them. Our hosts explained that a broken string would indicate that someone had possibly opened the refrigerator and stolen the materials inside.

I left Pokrov without much confidence in the security afforded the most lethal biological materials in the world.

Earlier this month, the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which I chaired, presented its final report, "World At Risk," to President George W. Bush, Vice President-elect Joe Biden, and congressional leaders. The report concluded that "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." But the type of catastrophe may be a surprise to some. In fact: "terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon."

The closest the United States has come to a bioterrorist attack was in October 2001, when letters contaminated with anthrax bacterial spores were mailed to two senators, a TV anchorman, and an employee of the National Enquirer. Seven letters were mailed, containing less than 15 teaspoons of anthrax. This miniscule quantity resulted in five deaths, placed 30,000 persons at risk, closed government buildings for months, and produced economic damage estimated at $6 billion. It isn't hard to imagine the consequences in death, destruction, panic, and dollars of a large-scale biological attack using anthrax spores manufactured from a vial like those in the refrigerators at Pokrov.

Biological materials are more ubiquitous and less secure than nuclear. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies have wisely expended tens of billions of dollars to identify, capture, and secure nuclear materials. The same cannot be said for lethal pathogens.The United States has cut back its biological threat reduction programs in Russia, and the Russians have refused greater transparency at their Ministry of Defense controlled biological weapons facilities. There is little reason to believe that the lethal pathogens of Pokrov are secure from falling into terrorist hands.

While the rugged and persistent anthrax spores remain the pathogen of first resort, the last two decades have seen an explosion of biological dangers. Since 9/11, the federal government has poured billions into defensive research on pathogens that might be used for bioterrorism. There are now 14,000 US scientists authorized to work on these materials, increasing the risk of a few bad apples with access. Shockingly, there continues to be no comprehensive regulation within the United States or internationally of the sites where lethal pathogens are produced or of the scientists capable of their production.

Al Qaeda remains intent on securing lethal pathogens for use against the United States. Agents of Osama bin Laden have been intercepted attempting to procure biological capabilities and materials in Europe and Asia. The laboratories we discovered in Kandahar after the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan have been relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As Richard Danzig, former secretary of the Navy, has observed, "Only a thin wall of terrorists' ignorance and inexperience now protects us."

Nuclear terrorism has been described as the ultimate preventable catastrophe. We hope so, and we also hope and believe our commission report has created a roadmap for significantly reducing the risk that the worst bacteria and viruses will fall into the hands of the worst terrorists and nations.

Former Florida governor and US senator Bob Graham served as chair of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.