The civil-military challenge

BUILDING an effective partnership between the president's civilian appointees and senior US military leaders has never been more important - or more challenging. We spent the last year unpacking the relationship's subtle complexities and identifying the assumptions and practices that have come to hobble national security decision-making, and found that the civil-military partnership needs repair.

President Obama has inherited a compounding set of problems - ongoing global military operations, long-deferred strategy and budget choices, and stark new economic realities. Anticipating the end of expanding budgets and unquestioned supplemental funding, the services will begin circling the wagons to defend programs and budget shares. All parties in the defense community will face enormous institutional pressure to protect their equities in the Pentagon and in the field with the help of allies in Congress. This is hardly an auspicious environment for building trust and cooperation.

Obama must not only fortify a relationship that has accumulated significant strains and endured occasional malpractice, he must make it strong enough to withstand inherent frictions and tough decisions. Several problems require attention from senior leaders - and are key barriers to restoring strategic and fiscal discipline within the Pentagon. The changes needed will only be manifested if the senior leadership, military and civilian, work together.

We interviewed several dozen former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service chiefs, and combatant commanders. While their views differed significantly depending upon their experiences, several themes emerged across six former administrations.

One finding is that senior civilian and military leaders often lack a common understanding of roles and reciprocal responsibilities within the partnership. The traditional shorthand that "civilians make policy and the military executes" is overly simplistic, masking the intricate mutual dependence of the parties. For example, civilians may not see their policymaking role as accompanied by a responsibility to ensure that military concerns about policy implementation have been fully addressed. Military leaders may define their substantive advising role narrowly and perform it only in response to civilian inquiry. These misunderstandings have proven costly in national security decision-making.

In addition, the parties largely fail to harness the inherent frictions in the relationship. The roles of various civil and military actors abut and overlap in practice, particularly when multiple civilian authorities (including members of Congress) are engaged. Managing the inevitable tensions without rancor or overreaction is a key responsibility of the civilian leadership.

Transparent and consistent decision-making processes would also help clarify roles and build trust in civil-military relations, particularly in terms of reinforcing the importance and scope of military advice. When that process is inclusive, it is viewed by military actors as more satisfactory - even if the outcomes are not preferred by military actors.

Still, there are no good options for military leaders who disagree with civilian decisions. Expressing professional views to civilians is part of the military's responsibility. But once decisions have been made, continued expressions of disagreement undercut civilian authority.

At the same time, civilian leaders must publicly assume accountability for their policy decisions. Hiding behind military advice undermines the military's professional independence and is an abdication of civilian responsibility.

Our research highlighted both the importance and fragility of the military's apolitical and nonpartisan status. Civilians should refrain from viewing military officers as "part of" or "loyal to" the administration during which they were appointed. The military participants found their most difficult challenge to be fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities to serve both the administration and the Congress objectively and professionally.

We found that partisan political activities of retired senior officers fueled civilian distrust of currently serving military officers. Retaining trust that the uniform military serve in an apolitical capacity is vital for a healthy civil-military dynamic. The retired community should carefully consider its public involvement in partisan activity.

The most recent defense reorganization, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, largely enhanced the quality of military advice through such innovations as creating a single chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet the reforms deserve a fresh examination in light of the expanding roles of regional combatant commanders and the potential diminution of the corporate military voice embodied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Finally, the relative imbalance of resources and expertise - whether between DOD and civilian agencies or between the military Joint Staff and the civilian staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense - was an increasing source of concern. The comparative strength of military actors risks overreliance upon military perspectives and capabilities in all aspects of policymaking and execution. An important recommendation for strengthening civil-military relations is a rebalancing of relative civilian and military capacity and authority.

We found that the character and relationships of senior officials are considered the single most important factor affecting civil-military relations. Policymakers should devote attention to civilian Pentagon appointments and the military should better prepare officers to assume senior roles in the partnership.

Leadership transitions are a particularly challenging time for civil-military relations. Personal relationships are embryonic, and interactions can be rife with missteps and misunderstandings as new partners begin their work together. A significant joint program of orientation to build relationships and clarify expectations is critical.

The Obama administration must invest early in setting the right tone, clarifying expectations and process, and building the relationships that will ensure both civilian and military leaders can fulfill their common oaths to protect and defend the Constitution.

Sarah Sewall and John P. White served in the Defense Department during the Clinton administration and on the Obama Presidential Transition Team. They teach at the Harvard Kennedy School, where they co-direct the Project on Civil-Military Relations.