Will Boston be a new bioweapons center?

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    Will Boston be a new bioweapons center?

    The only time the U.S. experienced a major bioweapon threat was the still mysterious anthrax attacks starting September 18, 2001. Allegedly, a bioweapon agent was spread in the U.S. by a microbiologist who worked at the main, former U.S. bioweapons laboratory and stole products of laboratory work done there. Skilled laboratory work, more than efforts of militant groups, remains a likely source of threats.

    Boston University is about to open an unusual new laboratory, equipped to work with the most dangerous biological pathogens, although it is not yet authorized to perform that level of work. [ Kay Lazar, South End biolab can open with restriction, Boston Globe, December 6, 2011, at http://bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/12/05/south-end-biolab-can-open-with-restriction/oliTGBxr9zy9diXJT16TML/story.html ]

     
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    New bioweapons threats from Clintons

    For lovelorn veterans of the long-lost UFO, there's hope.

    Our dear Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, warned about horrible weapons of terrorism: from molecular biology. Surely a Pearl Harbor anniversary was just a coincidence. [ Frank Jordans, Associated Press, Clinton warns of bioweapon threat from new gene assembly technology, Stamford Advocate (CT), December 7, 2011, at http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/business/article/Clinton-warns-of-bioweapon-threat-from-gene-tech-2360713.php]

    Fear of biobugs runs in the family. [ (President) Clinton proclaims Biotech Month, wants $340 Million to fight bioterrorism, Environmental News Service, January, 2000, at http://www.biotech-info.net/biotech_month.html ]

    The Clinton administration's invention of a biotechnology threat is well documented. [ Susan Wright, Terrorists and biological weapons: forging the linkage in the Clinton administration, Politics and Life Sciences 25(1):57-115, 2007, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~spwright/articles/WRIGHT.pdf ]

     
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    Re: Will Boston be a new bioweapons center?

    Well... You might be new in town. It is not a secret that this bioweapons research has been going on in mass since... there were bioweapons! Yes really. This is not news unless this is the 1920's. Thus Mass having major bioweapons research has not been NEW for a very long time.
     
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    A new bioweapon born in a lab

    Followers of the previous reader, if there were any, would be familiar with sarcastic assertions never supported by references or links to information. Likely reasons appear to include lack of referenceable support for those assertions; instead blobs have been drawn from a moldy stock of prejudice and rumor.

    We are not likely to learn about every project at the former Watertown Arsenal or the modern Army Soldier Systems Center in Natick. Readers should know that the United States signed in 1972 and ratified in 1975 the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, banning and foreswearing all types of biological weapons. The readers with longer associations with the topics will likely remember former Pres. Nixon's executive order on November 25, 1969, to halt work on biological weapons. The main U.S. bioweapons research center was at Fort Detrick, near Frederick, Maryland. The other U.S. bioweapons facilities were in Indiana (Vigo), Mississippi (Horn Island), New York (Plum Island) and Utah (Deseret).

    Potential for malicious mischief is growing greater, with abilities emerging from molecular biology to identify and isolate virulence factors and to graft those onto exogenous genomes and activate them. Those techniques, rather than speculative concepts of de-novo synthesis, represent the largest potential threats to the public. It is not necessary to have a BL-4 lab to do that work, but access to such a lab could be of significant help, as it apparently was to Dr. Bruce Ivins, the alleged "sole culprit" in the 2001 anthrax attacks. [ Margaret R. O'Leary, ed., Insider risk at high biocontainment labs, Suburban Emergency Management Project, September 28, 2009, at http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=651 ]

    Exactly such a potential threat has been in the news just recently: the "airborne H5N1 flu virus" developed at Erasmus Medical Center in Netherlands, confirming in an animal model the potential transmissibility of avian flu. Details of the work were embargoed at the request of the U.S. government. [ Denise Grady and Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Debate persists on deadly flu made airborne, New York Times, December 27, 2011, at
    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/science/debate-persists-on-deadly-flu-made-airborne.html ]

    Those of us who have experience in or around P2 and P3 labs, as they were known in the 1970s, will readily remember fears concerning biosafety focused on accidental releases into public environments, which proved rare, and on malicious mischief, which was never known to occur in the U.S. until the anthrax attacks of 2001. Most practical hazards mainly afflicted workers who did not have the protections of a P4 environment. [ A.G. Wedum, The Detrick experience, Journal of the American Biosafety Association 1(1):7-25, 1996, at http://www.absa.org/abj/abj/960101Wedum.pdf ]

     
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    Re: A new bioweapon born in a lab

    In Response to A new bioweapon born in a lab:
    Followers of the previous reader, if there were any, would be familiar with sarcastic assertions never supported by references or links to information. Likely reasons appear to include lack of referenceable support for those assertions; instead blobs have been drawn from a moldy stock of prejudice and rumor. We are not likely to learn about every project at the former Watertown Arsenal or the modern Army Soldier Systems Center in Natick. Readers should know that the United States signed in 1972 and ratified in 1975 the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, banning and foreswearing all types of biological weapons. The readers with longer associations with the topics will likely remember former Pres. Nixon's executive order on November 25, 1969, to halt work on biological weapons. The main U.S. bioweapons research center was at Fort Detrick, near Frederick, Maryland. The other U.S. bioweapons facilities were in Indiana (Vigo), Mississippi (Horn Island), New York (Plum Island) and Utah (Deseret). Potential for malicious mischief is growing greater, with abilities emerging from molecular biology to identify and isolate virulence factors and to graft those onto exogenous genomes and activate them. Those techniques, rather than speculative concepts of de-novo synthesis, represent the largest potential threats to the public. It is not necessary to have a BL-4 lab to do that work, but access to such a lab could be of significant help, as it apparently was to Dr. Bruce Ivins, the alleged "sole culprit" in the 2001 anthrax attacks. [ Margaret R. O'Leary, ed., Insider risk at high biocontainment labs, Suburban Emergency Management Project, September 28, 2009, at http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=651 ] Exactly such a potential threat has been in the news just recently: the "airborne H5N1 flu virus" developed at Erasmus Medical Center in Netherlands, confirming in an animal model the potential transmissibility of avian flu. Details of the work were embargoed at the request of the U.S. government. [ Denise Grady and Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Debate persists on deadly flu made airborne, New York Times, December 27, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/science/debate-persists-on-deadly-flu-made-airborne.html ] Those of us who have experience in or around P2 and P3 labs, as they were known in the 1970s, will readily remember fears concerning biosafety focused on accidental releases into public environments, which proved rare, and on malicious mischief, which was never known to occur in the U.S. until the anthrax attacks of 2001. Most practical hazards mainly afflicted workers who did not have the protections of a P4 environment. [ A.G. Wedum, The Detrick experience, Journal of the American Biosafety Association 1(1):7-25, 1996, at http://www.absa.org/abj/abj/960101Wedum.pdf ]
    Posted by AppDev


    PAAAARDDDDONN me. But I did mention MASSACHUSETTS as a state. And why bore people with weblinks they will(should) not follow because no one accepts and follows the links of a stranger.
     Although the people who do provide me with my income.
     As to bioweapons reasearch it never stopped. Anthrax research continued at umass amherst thru the 90`s. Look at the contracts for "medical" research by the military. Almost all of it involves understanding the biomechanisms of toxic attacks.
    Perfect weapons research, or should I say bioweapon defense research. You do not need a high security lab or even a high level bioconfinement facility to do the research. You need one to assemble a weapon. But all the research can be done in level one or two labs. And thats what happens in the real world. Just part of the buisness I'm in and it is obvious to me cause I see it everyday. No links needed. Take the questions I raise and do your own research you will learn skills and a great deal of info. I never trust the research of other posters anyway.
     

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