Re: Are all
posted at 5/20/2013 11:46 AM EDT
In response to PatsEng's comment:
In response to prolate0spheroid's comment:
In response to PatsEng's comment:
Though I do believe day 2 picks should eventually become starters I don't believe in a hard set cut off point more of a gradation of what to expect. As you move from the back of the 3rd into the 4th range you're hope is they eventually start (not pro-bowl) but also being solid contributors is a hope. If they can't even become contributors then yes they are busts at that point. The one thing I hesistate about your data is you point out pro-bowls for the last 25 of the top 100 picks but don't mention number of starts. I think most would agree that finding a pro-bowl that late in the draft is nearly an impossible task but to find someone who can at least give spot starts is more of what you are looking for. Even if it takes a couple of years for them to develop into that role. I personally like Z's definition. Top 15 picks you expect a pro-bowler, next 30ish picks a starter within the first 1-2 years with pro-bowl upside, next 40ish picks after is a starter within 2-3 years, and the final 25ish picks you hope to find a starter but at least a spot starter and solid contributor with 2-3 years.
Number of starts and number of games played would both be nice additions, but they aren't immediately available on Wikipedia and therefore would be much more time consuming to gather. However, I'd argue that how long a player lasts in the league combined with the number of times they change teams is a good rough gauge of quality. Sure there's noise in the data (good players, for instance, get injured and have careers cut short) but what I pulled gives you an idea what you can generally expect from players drafted with picks 76 to 100. I think it's pretty telling that more than 70% of the guys drafted between picks 76 and 100 in 2006 and 2007 are already out of the league, and many of them played for three or four teams during a shortish career. I think what the data suggests is that guys picked in this area of the draft tend to have four to six year careers (and change teams two or three times during that span), which suggests they are back ups or marginal starters who aren't sticking with any team for an extended time. This isn't to say they don't contribute (they wouldn't stick around at all if they weren't contributing at all), but most of these guys aren't becoming much more than back ups.
I'd agree with this, which makes you wonder how much value we really got in that trade, this being the case. A number of people praised the trade for getting so many picks for a single pick but since 2 of these picks fell into the range you are discussing (Ryan and Boyce even though technically Boyce was 102 close enough) those are the one's that need to be followed. So, it's kind of playing the odds that one of these guys will fall into that 30% catagory you are suggesting or the trade wasn't worth the value it produced. You would think given this data it would behove teams to move up and get as many picks in the first 75 spots as possible not move back into the 75-100 range. As I always said though Starting around day 3 (very late 3rd is close enough) is the spot when you want to take chances on high talent players who fall because of injury, drug problems, off-field issues because at that point the talent outweights the % of failure at that pick (ie Cannon, Hern, Dennard).
This is a really good point. When you look at the Pats so-called "value" strategy, it results in a larger number of picks in these mid (and lower rounds) where the odds of getting a true quality starter are fairly low. In defense of the value strategy, however, I think you can look at several factors that are important for the Patriots:
- First, the team has typically had fairly low picks in each round. While trading up to the top part of the first round would likely produce more impact players, it would require trading away a lot of picks, resulting in very few picks overall.
- Whenever the odds of getting a good player are low, multiplying the number of picks you have helps increase your chances of getting at least one good player. Trading up would reduce the picks the Pats have in middle rounds. Trading down increases them. Essentially, the trading up approach would mean the Pats would be putting all their eggs in one or two baskets. While those higher picks would have a much greater chance of being good eggs than bad, nothing is 100% certain even in the top part of the draft, and having very few picks in mid and lower rounds really diminishes the chance of getting anything good in those rounds.
- Trading up prior to the implementation of the rookie cap could create all sorts of salary cap issues, making that approach less desirable.
- Staying put (neither trading up or down) may not be significantly better than making a trade to try to turn one pick into two or three other picks, as long as one of those other picks isn't too much lower than the original (traded) pick. Dropping about 10 spots when you're picking around 30 might not change the odds of getting a good player all that much, but if you pick up another pick you have one more spin of the dice down draft.
The one major downside I see of the value approach, however, is petty much what you are saying: that there seems to be a rapid drop off in most drafts as you move from the top of the first round to the middle of the second round. A fairly large number of top 20 or 30 picks end up very good starters, but there seems to be a rapid drop off as you go from about pick 25 or 30 to about pick 50 or 60, and after about pick 60 the odds seem pretty low. I think the risk the Pats have run by trading down is moving from a part of the draft where their odds of getting a quality starter were reasonably good (low 20s, high 30s) to a part of the draft (40s and 50s) where their odds of getting a quality starter were much lower. Trading away the Clay Matthews pick for the Darius Butler and Brandon Tate picks is an example--though that example looks better when you also realize that the picks they got were (combined with additional deals) also used to help get Edelman and (a year later) Gronk. Still, they may have been able to get Edelman and Gronk by other means--and Matthews would have been a better guy to get than Butler and Tate.
I guess I think the jury is out still on the strategy. Overall it has generally worked to keep the Pats competitive, but I continue to believe that we have lacked enough impact players and that many of our postseason issues really are the result of having too few players with typical first round talent.