Nuclear precautions

TWO CLOUDS shadow the current review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty and Iran's reliance on a bad-faith interpretation to move toward the production of nuclear weapons. Those crises should be taken as potent proofs of the need to strengthen the treaty, not as signs that the treaty represents a futile defense against the ultimate security nightmare.

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Because the Bush administration has its own record of scorning elements of the treaty and belittling all treaty obligations that could impose limits on US action, the US case for reforming the Non-Proliferation Treaty is harder to make than it ought to be.

The treaty's original grand bargain asked non-nuclear states to forswear nuclear weapons in return for access to peaceful nuclear energy and a commitment from the nuclear states to reduce their arsenals and move toward nuclear disarmament. Under President Bush, the United States has not only been studying development of new nuclear weapons; Washington has also cast off the ABM Treaty with Russia, refused to ratify or back the comprehensive test-ban treaty, and held back from a proposed treaty to ban the fissile material that is indispensable for the production of nuclear weapons.

This behavior might be justifiable if hard-liners who oppose the test ban treaty had a better way than strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty to keep nuclear weapons from spreading to more states and eventually to terrorist groups. But there is no better way.

To prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability and to stop international networks in the mold of the one run by Pakistani metallurgist A. Q. Khan from selling Osama bin Laden the ultimate terror weapon, the United States will have to live up to the original bargain of the Non-Proliferation Treaty nd work with other countries to close loopholes.

A review conference being held in New York this month is considering a five-year moratorium on all enrichment of uranium. This could help derail the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons, and because it would be international, Iran could not pretend to be a victim of discrimination. There should also be severe penalties for any country that would emulate North Korea by exploiting the Non-Proliferation Treaty's rules to accumulate peaceful nuclear technology and then withdraw from the treaty. There is also a need for more on-demand, intrusive inspections of national nuclear programs as well as dispersed workshops and trading companies such as those that have been used by the A. Q. Khan network.

These improvements are doable, but only if the United States recognizes that true security in the age of globalization requires international cooperation.