North Korea's logic

NORTH KOREA'S apparent preparation for the test firing of a long-range missile, observed recently by US satellites, is commonly characterized as an utterly irrational, incomprehensible action. Although it is true that a successful North Korean launch of an ICBM would likely increase tensions with Japan and the United States, strengthen Japanese nationalists, alarm China, and could even provoke a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia, there is a rationale for North Korea's resort to the threat of a missile launch. It does not come out of the blue.

For more than a decade, the North has been trying to strike a deal with Washington to have the Americans buy out the North's nuclear and missile programs. The father and son dictators, Kim Il Sung and now Kim Jong Il, have sought security guarantees and normalized relations with the United States as well as energy supplies, food aid, trade, and foreign investment that would come primarily from South Korea but also from Japan and other developed countries.

The key for North Korea has always been direct negotiations on a deal with Washington. And the North has consistently said it would be willing to give up its missile program for the right price. Last year Kim Jong Il told South Korea's minister of unification: ``We are willing to forgo missile options if we form diplomatic ties and alliance with the United States."

The North's logic is hardly impenetrable. Its leaders have reason to be fearful of the United States, particularly since President Bush included their regime in his ``axis of evil" and administration hardliners have repeatedly undermined prospects for a negotiated deal with Pyongyang. Moreover, the North has earned hundreds of millions of desperately needed dollars selling missiles, missile components, and missile technology to Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and other buyers.

So North Korea's goal is a deal that definitively puts an end to hostile relations with Washington and compensates Pyongyang for surrendering its most lucrative export.

Last September, a breakthrough toward such a deal appeared within reach. In the context of six-party talks in Beijing, an agreement was struck on principles for negotiations leading to the North's nuclear disarmament. But then administration hardliners fastened on the Treasury Department's discovery of North Korean counterfeiting operations in Macao and slapped devastating banking restrictions on the North, causing the regime to stay away from the Beijing talks. And recently, when the regime invited chief US negotiator Chris Hill to Pyongyang for talks, US hardliners refused the invitation.

If the North does launch a missile in coming days, it will not be the only irrational party responsible for the ensuing crisis in Asia.