The British terror lesson
THE CONVICTION Monday of five men in Britain for planning a terrorist attack with a giant fertilizer bomb in 2004 offers a rare glimpse into the world of counter terrorist operations, illuminating the difficulty of preventing atrocities such as Sept. 11, or the July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London. The British case is instructive not only for what it suggests about problems and policies unique to Britain, but also because it highlights the undimmed threat from Al Qaeda and the need for a comprehensive strategy to cope with that threat.
Surveillance tapes made public after the 2004 bomb plot trial reveal that two of the July 7 subway bombers were recorded talking to a leader of the 2004 scheme by Britain's domestic intelligence service MI5. Opposition politicians are calling for an independent inquiry to determine why Mohammad Sidique Khan, a key figure in the 2005 subway bombings who was observed meeting four times with one of the 2004 conspirators, was not himself placed under surveillance.
The official answer is that MI5 was trying to keep track of 50 suspected terrorist networks at the time -- a number that has since swelled to 200 -- and had only so many resources to devote to full-time surveillance. The British security service has also noted that there was no sign in February 2004 that Khan and his July 7 accomplice Shehzad Tanweer were already planning the subway bombings, or any other terrorist crime. So they were categorized as "desirable" rather than "essential" targets for surveillance in 2004 -- even though they had been taped talking about traveling to Al Qaeda sites in Pakistan.
It should be evident not only that Britain needed more resources for counter terrorism than it had in 2004 and that MI5 should have notified local police about the two suspects, who turned up in an ongoing investigation. The larger lesson is that Al Qaeda has become more dangerous both as a terrorist command center and as the chief source for an ideological movement. The British trial tapes cast light on the direct links between Al Qaeda leaders sheltering in tribal areas of Pakistan and British citizens plotting bombings in London under Al Qaeda's guidance.
It is not merely British policies -- such as refusals to extradite radical preachers wanted on terrorism charges in other countries -- that have failed to reduce the Al Qaeda threat. President Bush has played into the hands of Osama bin Laden and his strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri. In Iraq, Bush gave them what they call the crusader occupation of an Arab country, which they wanted. And Bush's ally, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, still leaves Al Qaeda with the safe haven it needs.
Police and security services can only do so much in the fight against terrorism. There is also a need for leaders who do not play into Al Qaeda's hands and do not get distracted from the quest to crush the head of that snake.
