Aftershocks in Danvers

THE POWERFUL explosion last year at an ink manufacturing plant in Danvers exposed massive defects in the inspection of local businesses that use and store dangerous chemicals. The blast that damaged or destroyed 270 homes and businesses yielded many lessons on how to avoid such accidents, but it is unclear who, if anyone, has the authority and qualifications to apply such lessons in the future.

Last week, a team from the federal Chemical Safety Board determined that the likely cause of the blast at CAI Inc. was the ignition of flammable solvent vapor that accumulated after workers turned off the building's ventilation system at the end of the day. The federal investigators also charged that the company failed to follow standards for the safe storage, handling, and use of flammable solvents. Failure to detect those problems, according to the agency, falls on the Danvers Fire Department, the state fire marshal's office, and the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

The company flatly disputes the Chemical Safety Board's findings. That question should be resolved as the investigation deepens. But the most worrisome aspect of this case is that both the state fire marshal's office, which provides technical assistance to fire departments, and the Danvers Fire Department deny responsibility for inspection of such hazardous workplaces. Westwood Fire Chief William Scoble, president of the Fire Chiefs' Association of Massachusetts, adds that it is the rarest firefighter who is competent to assess chemical processes. The result, says Scoble, is a "black hole of authority."

State fire prevention regulations state clearly that it is the "duty and responsibility of the marshal or the head of the fire department" to enforce the fire code. But it is not so clear about who is responsible for finding the violations in the first place. A lack of specific permitting instructions for workplace chemicals clouds matters even more. The fire regulations, in fact, offer better guidance on permits needed to refinish bowling alleys or burn Christmas trees.

The fire chiefs make a point. But it shouldn't require a doctorate in chemistry to notice the absence of floor-level ventilation or automatic shutoff valves, and other dangers in Danvers cited by the federal officials. People living near hazardous workplaces want to know that their chiefs are taking all reasonable steps to protect them. And there is no ground for such confidence now.

The National Fire Protection Association in Quincy boasts chemical experts capable of training local fire officials how to spot workplace dangers. The group trained fire officials to recognize pyrotechnic dangers after the 2003 Rhode Island nightclub fire that killed 100 people. Similar exercises in chemical safety might help to quiet the effects of the Danvers blast.