Bush passes the buck
IN HIS SPEECH to the nation Thursday night, President Bush said America's engagement in Iraq will extend "beyond my presidency." Whatever the value of his candor, Bush was warning Republicans and Democrats alike that the calamities he has wrought in Iraq will have to be overcome by his successor.
In the national interest, presidential candidates of both parties should ask Bush not to slough off his responsibility for cutting US losses in Iraq. Bush's refusal to face up to Iraqi realities now will make the next commander in chief's task of ending the war much harder.
Bush's prescription for the next 16 months was more of the same. He asserted that perpetuating current tactics in Iraq would help "contain Iran." What he failed to mention was that his policies have broken the containment of Iran - and, in Iraq, brought to power Shi'ite factions under the tutelage of Tehran.
By the same token, Bush's postinvasion policy called for purging nearly all Sunni Arabs who had belonged to the Ba'ath Party from military, security, and civil service positions. This opened the way for the Sunni insurgency, the implantation of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the current sectarian civil war.
Difficult as it may be for Bush to acknowledge these strategic mistakes, recognizing the results of past actions is the first step toward policy changes that might limit or undo the damage already done to Iraq, the surrounding region, and US interests. Such realism demands recognition of at least two unpleasant facts. The first is that neither the Shi'ite religious factions who run the central government nor the Sunni tribal leaders who have been taking US arms and money to fight Al Qaeda have any desire to seek reconciliation on the basis of American-style compromises. The second unpalatable reality is that the Shi'ite-dominated government that US forces are defending has been allied not only with Iran but also with the virulently anti-American cleric Moqtada Sadr.
Bush's talk about reducing troop levels only gradually, in sync with military success on the ground, has little relevance to the Sunni-Shi'ite struggle for dominance in Iraq or to Iran's deepening influence with Shi'ite parties and militias. To cope with those snares, Bush or a successor will have to choose among lesser evils: either to take sides definitively in Iraq's power struggle or to help foster autonomous regions for Sunni Arabs, Shi'ites, and Kurds; either to build a regional alliance against Iran or to cut a pragmatic deal with the Islamic Republic. The longer these hard choices are postponed, the higher the price for both America and Iraq. 