GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, Pakistan's president, fooled nobody when he declared a state of emergency over the weekend because of what his official proclamation called an "ascendancy in terrorist activities." There has indeed been an increase in violence by extremist groups as well as large-scale operations by the Pakistani military against those groups. But the target of Musharraf's virtual martial law is not the radical Islamists; it is the secular opposition to his rule represented by Supreme Court judges, lawyers, independent television channels, and democratic political parties: Pakistan's constitutional order.
Musharraf's obvious motive for suspending the constitution is a desire to preserve his own power. He had gotten word that the Supreme Court was about to rule that his recent reelection by the federal and regional assemblies - which had originally come to office in partially rigged elections - was invalid. The ruling may have been based on the fact that, constitutionally, one person cannot hold both the posts of army chief and head of state.
It is also possible the court was about to rule that Musharraf was seeking a constitutionally prohibited third term, since he ruled from 1999 to 2002 without being elected and then was elected to a five-year term that just ended.
What is clear is that Musharraf does not trust either the decisions of an independent judiciary or the judgment of the public. These are symptoms of a dictatorial mind-set.
Musharraf's refusal to cede his powers over the government or the military has placed the United States in a compromised position. President Bush has not been shy about his support for Musharraf in the past. Pakistan has been receiving close to $2 billion per year, primarily in military aid to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The need for Pakistan's help in combating those jihadist bands is greater than ever, but the more the United States is identified with Musharraf, the more the public's disenchantment with him is translated into resentment against America.
Beyond the public statements of dismay already emanating from Washington, Bush ought to lean hard on Musharraf to release detained judges, lawyers, and opposition politicians, and also to permit parliamentary elections to go forward in January, as originally planned.
For the longer term, the United States should be as solicitous of Pakistan's civilian political parties as it has been of Musharraf. Bush should push for the lifting of tariffs on Pakistani textiles, and more US aid money should be directed to public schools for the poor in Pakistan - ultimately the most effective way to fight against religious extremists and their recruiters.
