Sharing the load in Iraq

By Borut Grgic and Alan L. Isenberg, 8/21/2003

AS TERROR struck Baghdad on Tuesday, taking 17 lives (including that of Sergio Vieira de Mello, who had been mentioned as a future UN secretary general), the world was again forced to confront the uncomfortable reality that Iraq is far from being a secure environment where a nascent democracy can grow. Al Qaeda's presence is on the rise; Saudi guerrillas and terrorists enter through Syria and wreak havoc on American soldiers. The number of casualties since the president declared combat operations over now exceeds the number of American soldiers killed in the fight.

There is no longer any doubt: America's role in Iraq is dangerously overextended. But there is a way to maximize security and stability while mitigating America's overwhelming exposure and responsibilities: a second UN Security Council Resolution bridging American, French, and German differences, and aligning their commitment in Iraq. The Europeans will have to be let in on some of the decision-making concerning Iraq's reconstruction. The extent of this involvement should be determined by a hard-headed analysis of the persisting security challenges and needs in Iraq and not by petty grandeur tagged along from the prewar days.

For the benefit of all, it's time to shake hands and make up. The current stubbornness in Washington and Paris (somewhat less so in Berlin) to move beyond the hard feelings is doing no one any good. Rather, to restore confidence and retain balance in the broader global security structure, the burden shouldered by the Americans must be shared. Most obviously, the Americans are not as experienced at peacekeeping as the Europeans, and the current state of Iraq is evidence that the coalition authority needs all the help it can get.

It's not just about Iraq, though. The United States has almost 200,000 combat forces committed within the Iraq-Kuwait-Afghanistan triangle. This is not only compromising its military leverage but may even restrict its ability to engage ing across the international security spectrum. Europe should be worried more about this overstretch than it is: It is in Europe's interest for the United States to continue projecting security proactively and globally, particularly given Europe's military shortcomings. Notwithstanding what the Brussels mandarins may think, European common foreign and security policy remains largely imprisoned by competing agendas, most notably the clash between Gaullism and Atlanticism.

Moreover, if America's overstretched presence in Iraq is supplemented by removing troops from other hotbed areas (Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently mentioned a potential downsizing of US troops in the Balkans), the United States will be cutting off its nose to spite its face. Allowing other regions to become more unstable when there is a multilateral solution that could avoid this problem altogether would be unnecessary and strategically myopic.

At the same time, it is folly to think it is in the interest of the United States to continue weathering the brunt of Iraqi reconstruction alone in the hope of maximizing its spoils. Pressures, both financial and emotional, far outstrip possible future returns. Iraqi reconstruction is now pegged at almost $4 billion a month. If the United States does not agree to share some of the burden of reconstruction, whatever spoils are gained will pale in comparison to the losses caused by deepening the federal budget deficit.

Moreover, the suffering morale of US soldiers, who are daily subjected to guerrilla warfare, could be significantly improved if they did not feel as though they were languishing in Iraq's deserts alone for an undetermined period of time. A more multilateral presence would boost both the efficacy and spirit of the reconstruction and peacekeeping. Then there is the question of resolve. If US blood continues to spill on Iraqi streets, growing domestic pressure (recall Vietnam) could push the White House into panic mode and induce a premature withdrawal. This scenario would badly hurt Middle East stability.

Finally, the diminished credibility that would arise from any failure in the reconstruction effort would profoundly detract from America's foreign policy ambitions.

A second Security Council resolution on Iraq, which would bring France, Germany, and the United States back onto the same page, would also make it easier for many other European states to come to America's aid and contribute more resources -- military and financial -- for stabilizing Iraq. It is also a prerequisite for recruiting other nations with skilled peacekeepers, most notably India.

However, the Americans will not negotiate if going to the Security Council will be paraded in Europe -- particularly in Paris and Berlin -- as a moral victory over US brashness. All sides, for the benefit of future Iraqi stability and legitimacy and for the maintenance of future American and European foreign policy aims, must move aggressively toward a desperately needed internationalization of Iraq's reconstruction.

Borut Grgic is adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia and a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. Alan L. Isenberg is contributing editor of the world affairs journal Orbis and an affiliated scholar at Stanford University's Institute for International Studies.