Shades of Vietnam in Iraq

It is hard to believe, but a year ago this week the United States was basking in the glow of a unanimous UN Security Council resolution -- with support from Syria, Britain, France, and Mexico -- finally bringing matters to a head with a recognized international outlaw in Iraq.

From that moment on, however, the United States has managed to squander all that goodwill and support in a truly astonishing display of duplicitous ineptitude -- and for what, the dubious distinction of occupying a country that should be forgiven its growing displeasure?

As the occupation boss, L. Paul Bremer, headed back to Baghdad last week to try to impose yet another American "solution" on a landscape no one in our government appears to understand, and to choose another bunch of pliant Iraqis who will in short order have all the trappings of puppet status, including targets painted on their backs, President Bush began flirting with a situation not encountered since the days of Vietnam.

At least until the situation changes, the United States is now embarked on an immense enterprise in Iraq that is increasingly resented by its people and decreasingly supported by the American people.

Bremer's latest summons home was sudden but the result of several dangerous developments occurring at the same time -- deteriorating security, the near-collapse of his hand-picked governing council, and the approach of UN deadlines the United States accepted for the commencement of efforts to jump-start democracy with no plans in place. However, the summons was also occasioned by his endorsement of a CIA report blending its own work with the field research of other agencies that concluded -- the Bush administration's sophomoric propaganda to the contrary -- that the Iraqi people, particularly its Shia majority, have begun to turn against the occupation because it is increasingly seen as all-American and ineffective.

Less attention has been paid to the climate here, but there was fresh evidence last week of serious deterioration. In a survey from the University of Pennsylvania's Public Policy Center -- part of a massive, ongoing study of the American electorate -- the headlines went to a finding that the country is now split down the middle on whether the situation in Iraq was worth war. The Independents in the sample have switched to 52-43 percent negative.

Much more ominously, the survey also showed more slippage in support for the all-important reconstruction effort. Asked the key questions about the US-financed program, only 5 percent said more money should be invested, with 31 percent supporting current levels of assistance. On the other hand, 36 percent said the United States should be spending less than it is now, and fully 24 percent said not a dime of American money should be going to Iraq. This last group is especially important. You cannot dismiss one-fourth of the electorate as a fringe group; those who oppose any money at all tend not to be partisan, to make less than the median income, and to be less educated.

In the face of numbers like these it is easy to understand why the latest installment of American money, the famous $87 billion, was approved by the Senate in a voice, as opposed to recorded, vote. After a year of false statements, poor policy choices, and ineffectual leadership, the miracle is that the numbers aren't worse.

Another lesson from Vietnam, however, is that the United States cannot sustain something as expensive, long-term, and dangerous as the occupation of Iraq without clear public support. Long before next year's presidential election the current atmosphere must change or the US effort will falter. What that requires is what the Bush administration has gotten used to avoiding -- bipartisanship.

The prescriptions are readily available -- a combination of a more vigorous offensive against insurgents as recommended by Republicans like John McCain with a less American, more international, and more independent-Iraqi political administration as recommended by Democrats like Senator Joe Biden.

Unfortunately, however, the Bush administration still follows a unilateralist instinct and a We-Know-Best occupation. The danger in "Iraqification" (itself a play on a Vietnam-era word) is that a frenetic devolution of security responsibility while American forces in Iraq are being reduced has the stench more of retreat with an eye on domestic politics than commitment to a successful reconstruction.

The other danger (it was a fact of life in Vietnam) is that military might cannot confer legitimacy on Iraqis who get chosen by the US occupation bosses to exercise political power. Legitimacy comes neither from the barrel of a gun nor from the decrees of occupiers.

The conventional wisdom here is that the silver lining in last week's cloud is Bush's recognition that his policies weren't working. That wisdom, however, will prove farcical if he maintains the unilateralist position that has cost America so dearly over the last 12 months.

Thomas Oliphant's e-mail address is oliphant@globe.com.