What the US needs from Ariel Sharon

As partners in the struggle against terrorism, Israel and America must look out for each other's interests and concerns. Israelis know that American aid and political support have had a positive impact on their country. But it works both ways. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prerequisite for the United States to secure the cooperation of Arab and Muslim governments, cooperation that America needs in order to wage an effective battle against terror and stabilize the situation in Iraq.

The United States expects that the leaders of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim countries will take political risks in order to quash global terrorism. Surely Sharon should expect that Israel will be asked to take difficult steps in order to address threats to international stability and calm regional temperatures.

The Israeli prime minister is not insensitive to the concerns of other countries. As recently as last week, Sharon told a high-tech conference in Tel Aviv that Israel must disengage from the Gaza Strip because of international pressures on Israel to accept "harmful" diplomatic plans.

But being susceptible to outside pressure does not automatically mean that Israel is sensitive to the needs of those who exert that pressure. Indeed, Sharon's record with regard to the United States is mixed. On one hand, he frequently refers to his "deep friendship" and "special closeness" with Bush. Despite recent threatening rhetoric, he has heeded America's warning not to expel or kill Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

On the other hand, Sharon has been willing to publicly rebuke the US president, as he did in 2001 by comparing post-9/11 efforts to improve relations with Arab states with Western acquiescence to Nazi Germany's takeover of Czechoslovakia. Last summer he rebuffed US requests that he be more forthcoming with former Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas.

"From now on, we will count only on ourselves," Sharon said at the time. But Israel can ill afford to go it alone. This hardly means Israel should allow the United States to dictate the terms of an agreement. But it does mean American considerations should not be seen only as "outside pressure"; these considerations should also be internalized as part of Israel's basic security strategy.

In his testimony last month before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, former defense secretary William Cohen said: "The road to peace in the Middle East runs through Baghdad. And success in Baghdad may very well run through Jerusalem. The unabated violence can only serve . . . to remain a breeding ground for even more savagery and nihilism in the future."

In this volatile environment, while Israel needs to give primacy to its own political, economic, and military aims as it considers how to disengage from Gaza, Sharon should also remain cognizant of America's regional priorities when the Bush administration makes specific requests.

For example, the United States has asked Israel to build its security barrier in a way that has minimal negative impact on the prospects for reaching a diplomatically sustainable solution. The Bush administration also wants to assure that the Israeli pullout from Gaza is not a mere ploy designed to bring about greater Israeli control over the West Bank. These expectations should be at least as important, if not more important, for Sharon than whatever desire he has to placate his right-wing domestic opposition.

Similarly, Sharon should be mindful that Israel's request for US support comes at a time when questions are being asked about the extent to which protecting Israel was a motivation for America's Iraqi campaign. While it is perfectly legitimate for the United States to care about the future of Israel, our only democratic ally in an otherwise undemocratic and increasingly hostile region, it borders on the absurd to suggest that Israel's interests were primary among the administration's reasons for going to war.

But the fact that such questions are being asked reinforces our hope that Israel will make good on its responsibility to the United States. After all, an alliance has to be a two-way street. If it isn't, it won't survive and we, American Jews who care deeply about Israel, will face a much greater challenge maintaining America's concrete commitment to the Jewish state in the years ahead.

Henry Rosovsky, a dean and professor emeritus at Harvard University, is a vice-chair of Israel Policy Forum. Jonathan Jacoby is director of Israel Policy Forum's Institute for Policy and Communications.