An exit strategy for Iraq

ZIGZAGGING THROUGH the streets of Baghdad in a heavily armored military convoy doesn't give you an opportunity to talk to Iraqis. But it tells you everything about the security situation. What I saw in Iraq last week was a different country than the one I visited in August of 2003. Where Americans could once walk around freely, Baghdad today is a highly fortified city and Americans cannot interact with Iraqis who have not been screened for weapons and explosives.

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The security situation in Iraq has significantly deteriorated, even as the American troop presence increased by more than 50 percent during 2004. Despite intensifying efforts to root out the insurgency, every measure seems to indicate that it continues to grow in strength and sophistication. The frequency of attacks is on the rise, the insurgents are finding a growing base of sanctuary and support in the population, and they seem to have quickly rebounded from defeats in Fallujah and elsewhere.

The facts on the ground indicate that the violence will continue past the upcoming elections on Jan. 30, no matter what the result. This worsening state of affairs has prompted Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to announce a bottom-up review of US policy. This review is long overdue. Two years into America's occupation of Iraq, it is high time to rethink our goals and ask whether our current strategy is helping to achieve those goals.

Unlike in Germany and Japan after World War II -- and more recently in Bosnia and Kosovo -- the commitment to maintaining a long-term military presence is not the key to a successful peacekeeping and reconstruction strategy in Iraq. As former CIA official Michael Vickers put it, our "presence has fueled the Iraqi insurgency as much as it has suppressed it."

Every time the administration signals that our troops will be in Iraq for "as long as it takes," it confirms Iraqis' suspicions that the United States intends a permanent presence. Every time Iraqi citizens see a Bradley fighting vehicle rolling through their cities, it undermines our assertion that Iraq is sovereign. Every time Iraqi bystanders are killed in coalition actions, it further erodes the good will the United States earned by toppling Saddam's regime. The American presence has become inherently destabilizing.

Some have suggested that the United States should immediately withdraw. But this option could lead to the collapse of the interim Iraqi government and ensuing civil war. Another option, increasing the American presence, is also not realistic. Our military is dangerously overstretched and, thus far, increases in our force size have been ineffective at weakening the insurgency.

The best option to turn the situation around is to announce a timetable for a phased drawdown of US forces. The United States should lay out and stick to a schedule in which the majority of our forces leave Iraq by the end of this year and all but a much smaller contingent leave by mid-2006 -- a full two years after the transfer of sovereignty. Perhaps most important, President Bush must make clear that the United States does not seek to maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq.

Announcing a timetable for a carefully planned withdrawal would help win support for the fledgling Iraqi government, which has been undermined by the appearance that it is little more than a puppet of a foreign occupier. It would also instantly enhance our legitimacy in many parts of the world, helping encourage allies to contribute specialized units to help train Iraqi security forces.

In Iraq today, US forces are the focal point for tensions and violence. This has unified the various elements of the insurgency -- Islamic extremists, Sunni nationalists, foreign jihadists, all of whom have little in common but opposition to the US presence. Our current strategy has removed the urgency for Iraq's ethnic and religious factions to forge the political compromises needed for a workable balance of power. A withdrawal could be structured in a way to create incentives for various factions to come to the negotiating table instead of engaging in armed insurrection.

Two key factors will enable the withdrawal of forces over the next 12 to 18 months. First, training the Iraqi security forces must be our highest priority. Training should emphasize quality, not quantity. This is crucial, as lasting security in Iraq can only be provided by Iraqis.

The United States must also reform its reconstruction efforts to expedite aid money to projects that have an immediate impact on employment. Thus far, only about $4 billion of the $21 billion Iraq reconstruction fund has actually been spent. With unemployment at 30-40 percent, the insurgency has found an ample supply of labor. Even as we seek to bring the military chapter of our involvement to a close, we must continue to support Iraq's transition into a fully functioning, stable economy.

The removal of Saddam Hussein was a victory for the United States. Our brave young men and women in uniform fought brilliantly to bring an end to the genocidal Ba' athist regime. But lasting success in Iraq won't be achieved until the country is stable -- and the last American soldiers have come home. Marty Meehan is a Democratic US representative from Lowell.