Abbas needs a partner -- will it be US?

PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT Mahmoud Abbas arrives in Washington in an unenviable, if familiar predicament -- showered with rhetoric, neglected on policy. After only four months in office, his record is noteworthy by any standards, let alone those of the Middle East. A cease-fire has been reached and largely adhered to by Palestinian militants, violence has fallen dramatically, democratic and internationally monitored local elections conducted, and security forces restructured. Not bad after the blood-letting and desperation of the past four years.

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Does more need doing? Absolutely. But rather than being encouraged along this path of nonviolence and democratic reform, Abbas finds himself undermined at every turn by Israel, his supposed ''partner for peace." Congress has joined in by essentially preventing the disbursement of US aid to Abbas's Palestinian Authority. This despite Israel and America's clear interest in the platform of antiterror, pro-democracy, and political realism succeeding in the Palestinian territories.

By electing Abbas with a thumping majority, the Palestinian public was giving this platform a chance -- a conditional chance. Palestinians want reform, but they also need to be convinced that nonviolence can deliver their broader political aspirations of ending occupation and achieving real freedom. The sell is made harder by Ariel Sharon's Gaza evacuation being unilateral and not the product of negotiations. The Hamas claim that terror succeeded has real traction. The Palestinian street will need to be convinced otherwise for nonviolence to take root, and for this Abbas needs an Israeli partner.

To argue this case is not to ignore that additional Palestinian Authority reforms are badly needed. It simply recognizes that Israeli policies, and especially restrictions on freedom of movement, disproportionately determine Palestinians' daily lives. Nor does this explanation constitute an apology for terror. To understand and then undermine the environment in which terror thrives is all about better counter-terror policy, not making excuses.

True, Israel is busy preparing to withdraw from Gaza and four Northern West Bank settlements in less than 100 days. But if that is to set in motion a positive momentum, Israel and America must end the policy of abandoning Abbas to Hamas.

The Gaza disengagement can establish a precedent of ending occupation that paves the way to a viable two- state solution, as envisaged by President Bush and detailed in the Geneva Initiative model agreement.

Just as plausibly, a unilateral Israeli withdrawal claimed as a Hamas victory, paralleled by Israeli entrenchment in the West Bank, could be a formula for Gaza first, Gaza last, and a third intifada.The ''what next after Gaza" debate will be played out in three key arenas: Israel, Palestine, and the United States.

In Washington, Abbas should set out what he has achievedand what his plans are for the future, including his strategy to incapacitate militants and coordinate the withdrawal from Gaza and make a success of evacuated areas. He should also avoid overplaying the blame game, as should Sharon.

The pressing question is whether Abbas will find a partner in Washington for his core message. That consists of an unconditional commitment to good governance and nonviolence as a Palestinian priority while recognizing that this agenda is unlikely to succeed without a political horizon that would end the conflict and the occupation. This also happens to be a shared Palestinian, Israeli, and US interest.

The message assumes added urgency as the win-win scenario of a viable two-state solution comes under renewed assault from two directions. One is continued Israeli creation of facts on the ground that may fatally undermine this outcome -- namely, settlement expansion, especially around Jerusalem, and the separation barrier route. The other is excessive reluctance from the Israeli government to take measures that strengthen the Palestinian partner, measures that do not harm Israel's security.

The required response demands a degree of US commitment that has so far been absent. It means complementing security and economic coordination with political reengagement. Washington cannot be a substitute for the partner that Abbas has not yet found in Israel. But in Washington Abbas can perhaps find a partner for pursuing conflict resolution and not just management to realize that viable two-state vision and avoid more suffering on all sides.

Daniel Levy served as a policy adviser in the Israeli prime minister's office. He was the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.