Time for straight talk on Iraq
PRESIDENT Bush failed to offer any new ideas on how to win the war in Iraq during his recent speech at Fort Bragg, N.C. He simply rehashed campaign rhetoric and patriotic platitudes without addressing the core concerns of Americans: How will the insurgency be defeated? What milestones measure success? When will our troops come home? It's time Bush leveled with the American people.
After two years of spiraling violence, it is apparent that the insurgency cannot be defeated through military means alone. Only a legitimate political process can inspire Iraqis to stand in defense of their governing institutions.
The transitional administrative law, adopted on March 8, 2004, describes steps and a timetable for ending the occupation. The law called for elections in January 2005. The new government is to draft a constitution by Aug. 15, to be disseminated, debated, and ratified by the national assembly prior to a popular referendum on Oct. 15. Iraqis go the polls on Dec. 15 to elect a new government for a five-year term.
The Jan. 30 elections were a watershed in the country's history. Amid threats of violence, more than 8 million Iraqis went to the polls. The Bush administration heralded the ballot, but democracy involves much more than voting. It is about the distribution of political power through institutions and laws that guarantee accountable rule.
Though the elections produced a wave of optimism, the three-month delay in establishing a new government has been intolerable to Iraqis who risked their lives to vote based on the expectation that Iraq's new political leaders would act quickly to address escalating violence and improve basic services. When the new government appointed a constitutional commission, only two Arab Sunnis were initially included among its 55 members. Arab Sunnis, most of whom boycotted the elections on Jan. 30, have become convinced that Iraq's Arab Shi'a and Kurd-dominated government is bent on domination rather than accommodation.
Iraqi politics are traditionally defined by regionalism and distrust among ethnic and sectarian groups. Negotiations over the permanent constitution are sure to sharpen differences. Though Iraqis face a daunting challenge agreeing on the complex details of power-sharing, efforts should be made to meet the Aug. 15 deadline for a new constitution. Failure to do so would further fuel resentment and violence.
The good news is that some common ground already exists: Most Iraqis agree that the system of government should be federal, democratic, and pluralistic. They agree on the need for a separation of powers and for checks and balances. Given that the problem with governance in Iraq has always been too much power in Baghdad, Iraqis agree on the need for decentralization while assigning specific powers to the national government (e.g. national defense, customs control, and fiscal policy). In the new Iraq, it is envisioned that Iraqi states would control all affairs not explicitly assigned to the national government.
If his exit strategy is linked to the establishment of Iraqi governance, Bush needs to explain how Iraq will be governed in the future. Hot-button issues -- such as the role of religion, demobilizing militias, the status of Kirkuk, and control of Iraq's oil wealth -- threaten to break consensus and spark greater violence.
Reflecting the Muslim character of Iraqis, Islam is sure to be the official religion of Iraq, with Iraqis insisting that laws adopted by the national government within the scope of its authority be consistent with Islamic law. But will Shari'a law apply to family law such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, thereby oppressing women?
The best way to resolve simmering tensions in the city of Kirkuk, which is claimed by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen alike, is to reverse Saddam's ethnic correction policy through a systematic property compensation process. Once displaced persons have gone home, a referendum could be organized determining whether Kirkuk becomes part of a federal Iraqi state called Kurdistan. What role does the United States envision for the UN in returning displaced persons?
Iraq's oil wealth should be managed by the national government with revenues redistributed to federal and local governments based on population percentages.
Militias should be co-opted into the Iraqi Army and border guard under national government command, as well as local police forces reflecting the ethnic composition of the communities they serve. Are these measures feasible?
In response to those who demand a date for departing Iraq, Bush needs to explain that US strategy will be measured in milestones, not arbitrary deadlines. Bush must explain why US troops are needed in Iraq until a permanent constitution is adopted so the political process goes forward in relative safety. Bush must make clear that when the constitution is adopted and full sovereignty restored to Iraqis, the United States will consult with the Iraqi government on a new status of forces agreement and finalize a schedule for withdrawing US troops.
Bush is correct that by invading Iraq we have made it the central front in the war on terror. Events in Iraq will shape US foreign policy for years to come. A precipitous departure would spark conflict between Iraqis and ignite a broader regional conflict. America's failure and retreat from Iraq would embolden radicals and extremists throughout the Muslim world.
But by spinning instead of speaking substantively, Bush has compounded concerns about his credibility. Other than staying the course, the United States appears to lack a strategy for success in Iraq. The American people are waking up to the fact that they are less safe because President Bush invaded Iraq without a plan to win the peace.
David L. Phillips, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is author of ''Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco." 
