The US needs to stay in Iraq
AS THE war in Iraq enters its fifth year with no end in sight, the public's desire to leave Iraq is understandable. But it is also unfortunate. The troop "surge" and the accompanying new security plan for Baghdad stand a real chance of reducing violence to a level that will allow the Iraqi government to emerge as a legitimate authority worth supporting. For the first time, the military is applying a winning strategy in the capital.
The central goal of fighting an insurgency is securing the population. Doing so drives a wedge between insurgents and the people among whom they hide and derive support.
Insurgents cannot operate if civilians consistently inform on their activities and refuse to harbor them. People are only willing to do so if they feel secure. Typically, this means a large, continual security presence among the people. Only then can economic development follow and finally win over the populace.
Instead of this approach, top commanders in Iraq previously focused on the assumption that the presence of US troops fueled the insurgency. The goal was thus to replace US troops with Iraqi forces. As US troops left, security would improve. While this approach had a certain logic to it, facts on the ground never bore it out because Iraqi forces proved incapable or unwilling to protect both Sunnis and Shi'ites. Previous security plans for Baghdad consisted almost wholly of Iraqi forces and were complete failures.
The resulting chaos in Baghdad served as a wake-up call to the United States. The military adopted a bold new strategy, whose departure from the past has not been appreciated. Coalition forces are now committed to securing the population in Baghdad, not just turning over the fight to Iraqis. It is hard not to overstate the importance of the shift since it finally directs coalition efforts at the right objective.
The most important feature of the new strategy is joint security stations. The outposts are manpower intensive, which is why the troop surge is needed. A US unit is paired with an Iraqi counterpart and permanently stationed in residential areas.
This joint presence, which reduces abuse by Iraqi forces, protects Sunnis and Shi'ites, removing the impetus to resort to sectarian violence. The joint security stations have their critics. Some say they are easy stationary targets and will only increase US casualties. However, where a similar strategy has been employed, it has met with great success.
After the battles in Fallujah in November 2004, my commander had the wisdom to forward deploy our company in Iraqi towns and pair our platoons with Iraqi counterparts. It was no longer necessary to use vehicles to patrol from distant, large bases. Off the roads, we stopped suffering casualties from improvised explosive devices. Since we lived where we patrolled, we built trust with local Iraqis, which proved the catalyst for a wave of intelligence on insurgent activity.
The final result was no coalition casualties and an end to insurgent attacks in the area. Other units in Anbar Province have recently pursued a similar strategy and achieved success in securing cities along the Euphrates River, which serve as a supply line to Sunni insurgents in Baghdad. Apparently, most Iraqis care more about security than they do about the presence of US forces.
The joint security station concept would founder without the proper leadership to believe in it, promote it, and sustain it. Fortunately, such leadership is now in place. General David Petraeus, the new commander of US forces in Iraq, leads a dream team of the top specialists in counterinsurgency. While slow to come around, the US military is getting better at this complicated type of warfare.
The insurgents, of course, have a say in how the new plan unfolds. Violence has flared in nearby regions as insurgents flee Baghdad. Coalition forces thus must have enough time to develop the local relationships and intelligence needed to counter changing insurgent tactics. Recent calls by military commanders to maintain increased troop levels into 2008 reflect this reality.
The biggest danger now is that the public and Congress are so pessimistic that US forces will be withdrawn before the strategy has time to produce results. Ultimately, this view reflects a lack of understanding about how this strategy, unlike previous failed plans, is a real change in the right direction. Such skepticism is understandable considering the difficult last four years. But it risks cutting short the best hope yet for putting Iraq on the right course.
Erik Swabb served in Iraq as a Marine infantry officer. He now attends Harvard Law School. 
