A 'Plan B' with teeth for Darfur

IF THERE is a Guinness Book of World Records entry for most threats issued with no follow-up, the international response to Darfur is likely setting a new standard. The United States is the only government to call the atrocities in Darfur genocide and is uniquely positioned to lead an effective response. Yet the Bush administration's empty threats over the past three years have emboldened Khartoum to escalate its destruction and obstruction in Darfur.

At the Holocaust Museum in Washington, President Bush recently unveiled "Plan B," the latest US threat but one that contains the seeds of a policy shift away from an incentive-based policy to one based on real pressures and punitive measures. But "Plan B" is not yet strong enough and must be buttressed in specific ways. If it is transformed into a real set of multilateral punitive measures with teeth, the administration has an opportunity to lead in bringing the horrors in Darfur to an end.

During the 18 years of its military rule, the regime in Khartoum has responded only to focused international and regional pressure. Three times the regime has reversed its position on a major policy issue: support for international terrorism, support for slave raiding militias in southwestern Sudan, and prosecution of a war in the South that took 2 million Sudanese lives. Behavior change in Khartoum resulted from intensive diplomacy backed by serious pressure -- two ingredients that, despite the stirring speeches, are missing from the response to Darfur today.

The current "Plan B" is too unilateral and thin to fulfill its potential in changing the calculations in Khartoum. The United States has been blocking many Sudanese transactions since 1997, when President Clinton imposed sanctions on the regime for its support for terrorism and human rights violations. After 10 years of US sanctions, the Sudanese government and its commercial partners have figured out how to circumvent additional unilateral US measures. The Sudanese oil industry has flourished during the past decade, and business can be conducted with impunity because the energy sector is largely beyond the scope of existing US sanctions.

With little support from the CIA because of close counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Khartoum, US policy makers are largely in the dark about how the Sudanese government transacts its oil business. The United States needs an intelligence surge from the CIA and an enforcement surge from the Treasury Department to undertake the following financial and diplomatic measures that would go further than the administration's current plan.

First, the United States should work through the UN Security Council to impose targeted sanctions against leaders responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur. The existing "Plan B" targets only three individuals. A real "Plan B" should target many more of the killers, and in particular three senior Sudanese officials who may be most responsible of all: Assistant to the President Nafie Ali Nafie, Director of National Intelligence Salah Abdullah Gosh, and Minister of Defense Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein. These individuals maintain a tight grip on Sudan's labyrinthine security apparatus and continue to pursue a military solution in Darfur.

Second, the United States should work to impose UN Security Council sanctions against the list of Sudanese companies already targeted unilaterally by the United States, and establish a UN Panel of Experts to further investigate which companies are conducting the business necessary to underwrite Sudan's war machine.

Third, similar to the case of Iran, US officials should engage with a number of international banking institutions to strongly encourage them to stop conducting oil-related transactions that benefit the Sudanese regime.

Fourth, the United States should provide declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to help accelerate the process of building indictments against senior officials in the regime for crimes against humanity. Accountability is one of the core requirements for a lasting peace in Darfur, and the United States should be supporting the ICC investigations as a matter of principle.

Meanwhile, accelerated planning processes should commence within the NATO framework for two coercive military measures -- a no-fly zone and ground forces focused on protecting civilians and humanitarian operations -- with the understanding that any action would at least seek UN Security Council approval. In its absence, action would be taken only if the situation deteriorated dramatically and all other avenues had been explored.

The United States must move away from its current policy of constructive engagement without leverage to a more muscular policy focused on walking softly and carrying -- and using -- a bigger stick. Unfulfilled threats and appeals should be replaced quickly with a "Plan B" with teeth backing a robust peace and protection initiative. We may not know the names of the victims in Darfur, but we know the names of the orchestrators of the policy that led to their deaths. It is time they paid a price.

John Prendergast is co-founder of the ENOUGH Campaign and co-author of "Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond."