Franchising Al Qaeda
AS THE LEBANESE Army continues to battle Fatah al-Islam, a jihadist group operating in the Nahr Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, questions are being raised about the group's relationship to Al Qaeda and whether it is an official part of Osama bin Laden's network. Indeed, since 9/11, Al Qaeda's name has been applied liberally to numerous individuals and groups believed to be engaged in jihadist terrorism. However, while Al Qaeda does provide logistical and financial support to jihadist cells and continues to serve as the inspiration for countless jihadist groups across the globe, bin Laden does not allow any group to carry the brand name "Al Qaeda" without his approval. Groups wishing to join Al Qaeda officially must meet certain requirements before they are granted the right to adopt the name.
The path to receiving acceptance from Al Qaeda's leadership can take several months. Consider the process for the Algerian jihadist group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat.
In September 2006, both Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat in Algeria proclaimed that the group was joining Al Qaeda. In his pledge of allegiance, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, the emir of the group, gave up significant autonomy to bin Laden, conceding, "We will give him the proceedings from our hands and the fruit from our hearts, to continue our jihad in Algeria as soldiers under his . . . instructions. He can use us to strike whomever and wherever he wishes, and he will find nothing but obedience from us and shall only receive what pleases him."
However, the group continued carrying out terrorist attacks under its own name. It was not until the end of January that Abdul Wadud announced that the group was officially changing its name to Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb. Abdul Wadud explained that the four-month gap between its pledge and the name change was due to waiting for bin Laden's approval: "We cared about this matter since the first day of the announcement of the joining, but nothing prevented us from concluding it, only after the consultation of Shaykh Osama, may Allah preserve him, and with his permission and choice. This obstacle was removed today with thanks unto Allah."
The reason for this delay is to protect the value of the "Al Qaeda" brand name, which continues to carry the most weight in the global jihadist community.
Should Al Qaeda prematurely allow a group to adopt its name, that group may embark on actions contrary to Al Qaeda's ideology that could damage its reputation and embarrass its leaders. Al Qaeda needs to be sure that groups bearing its name operate in line with its long-term vision to protect its status as the leader of the global jihadist movement.
This was evident in the formation of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq until his death last summer, engaged in eight months of negotiations with the leaders of Al Qaeda before pledging his allegiance to bin Laden and merging his Tawhid wal Jihad group with Al Qaeda in October 2004. The reasons for the lengthy negotiations were probably in part due to the difficulty of transmitting secure messages between Zarqawi and the Al Qaeda leadership. However, both sides also likely hesitated due to conflicting beliefs in strategies and tactics on how to wage jihad.
The leaders of Al Qaeda were likely concerned with how a merger with Zarqawi might affect its brand. Zarqawi had risen to fame in Iraq through horrendous filmed decapitations of hostages that generated publicity but alienated many, some of whom Al Qaeda viewed as potential supporters. In a July 2005 letter, Zawahiri reminded Zarqawi "that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Ummah." Zawahiri chastised Zarqawi for his brutality, arguing, "Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages." Notably, filmed beheadings from Al Qaeda in Iraq had ceased by the time Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden, perhaps indicating that even Zarqawi understood that maintaining the name of Al Qaeda trumped any publicity from such gruesome scenes of horror.
The decision to carry the Al Qaeda name is not an entirely easy choice for a group. Bearing the brand requires a certain amount of deference to Al Qaeda's leadership, both operationally and ideologically, which the leaders of some groups might find distasteful. On a security level, any group touting the Al Qaeda name will instantly become an international enemy to countries around the world combating the jihadist threat. At the same time, however, there are immense benefits. The name is so powerful and widely respected within the global jihadist community that merely being associated with it affords a group instant social support, grants it a worldwide audience, and ensures a steady stream of international mujahideen willing to fight alongside the group's members.
Though distinguishing between groups that are officially part of Al Qaeda and those that are not may seem like splitting hairs, recognizing that not all jihadist groups or individuals are members of Al Qaeda helps us to understand that the "war on terror" is not just a war on Al Qaeda or groups affiliated with it. Rather, the war on terror is a war on a global jihadist movement of which Al Qaeda is only a part, albeit extremely influential. The common thread between all jihadist groups is that they share a similar ideology. Because this ideology does not derive its legitimacy from Al Qaeda or bin Laden, the jihadist movement will continue to exist whether there is a group called Al Qaeda or not. It is this entire movement that must be debased simultaneously, not one single group.
Rita Katz and Josh Deven are director and senior analyst of the SITE Institute, an international terrorist-investigation and information group. 
