The more muscular Japan
WHILE MANY nations are breathing a collective sigh of relief after North Korea's official commitment to move forward on disabling its nuclear facilities, one country is still holding its breath: Japan.
After decades of North Korean military provocations, Kim Jong Il now has a big problem on his hands, as the Japan of old is transforming into an increasingly more muscular nation, one less hesitant to use force.
Relations between the two countries have long been contentious and mutually distrustful. From Pyongyang's perspective, Japan's military alliance with the United States and its history of harsh colonial rule have remained impediments to normal relations. From Tokyo's perspective, North Korea's brazen abduction of Japanese nationals during the late 1970s and early 1980s, its repressive authoritarianism, and its flagrant militarism make North Korea a repellent neighbor. North Korea's bellicosity, including its continued resistance on the abductee issue, has emboldened the conservatives who govern Japan and hardened public opinion against North Korea. It has also made Japan stronger. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was repudiated at the polls for ignoring domestic issues, but popular concern about North Korea-- a flame Abe long has fanned-- has not abated. Indeed, if anything, Japanese citizens are more concerned because they are less certain of the US commitment to the issues they care most about.
Given North Korea's recent military antics over the past decade, it has been easy for the Japanese public to perceive Pyongyang's militarism and persistent provocations as Japan's greatest security threat -- one much less ambiguous than China's, which is, after all, encased in considerable economic benefit. Horrifying accounts of North Korean capabilities and stated North Korean intentions allow Japanese leaders to make the case for enhancing Japan's defense without even mentioning China.
By playing the villain from central casting with ease and effect, North Korea has made it easy for threat inflators. During two rounds of "nuclear diplomacy" -- 1993 to 1994 and 2003 to 2006 -- Pyongyang took such provocative actions as conducting ballistic missile tests, ordering fighter sorties across the maritime border with the Republic of Korea, firing antiship missiles into the Sea of Japan, and harassing US reconnaissance aircraft.
Will recent progress at the six-party talks calm Tokyo down? Many Japanese believe that, just as in the past, Pyongyang officials will reverse their commitments when they no longer suit them. In fact, there is unprecedented support for the military and for the first time since 1945, the Japanese public is now openly expressing hostility toward another country. Unlike China, where the business community acts as a brake on a Japanese hard line, businesses are largely indifferent to relations with North Korea. As a result, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been free to define the North Korea issue in purely political terms, and thus making it easier to justify new weapon systems and to continue enhancing Japanese military power. The Democratic Party of Japan, the leading opposition party-- and now the majority party in the House of Councillors-- has been loath to adopt a different position.
The Pyongyang-induced surge in popular support for a stronger Japan has also given voice to calls for a more independently capable one. While the US-Japan security alliance is not in danger, Japanese officials are wondering about the nature and extent of Washington's commitment to defend Japan through extended deterrence -- the so-called "nuclear umbrella." After all, say some in Tokyo, US negotiators were unable to gain concessions on the abduction issue from the North Koreans, but went ahead with a deal anyway. If the larger US commitment is judged less than ironclad, strategic doctrinal change will be in the offing.
There has already been open and serious discussion as to whether Japan should develop its own nuclear arsenal. Strategists are certain to demure for now, but they will continue to press the United States for clearer guarantees, promises that may be more than Washington is willing or able to convincingly provide.
As the only country to have had nuclear weapons used against them, this is no small irony. As we mark the 62d anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it appears that diplomacy has, at least temporarily, stemmed the tide of nuclear ambitions in North Korea. Yet, the question remains: When and where will this tide rise again? All bets are off, but you can count on one thing: The next time Japan will be walking taller, and it may be carrying a bigger stick.
Richard J. Samuels is director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His book, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, will be published next week. 
