Turkey's Iraq problem
PRIME MINISTER Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey is under tremendous pressure to act decisively against the Kurdistan Workers' Party. He should resist demands for military action. Attacking the PKK in Northern Iraq would have serious repercussions, undermining Turkey's democratic development, radicalizing Turkish Kurds, and risking a regional conflagration while adversely affecting relations between the United States and Turkey, as well as Turkey's candidacy for membership in the European Union.
The PKK launched its armed struggle in 1978 with the goal of ending repression and establishing "Greater Kurdistan," encompassing territory in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Turkish state responded by declaring a state of emergency in the Kurdish areas of Southeastern Turkey and cracking down with its military. Up to 30,000 people died in the ensuing conflict.
Promising reforms, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, the AKP, swept parliamentary elections in July 2007. During my visit to Turkey a few weeks ago, many Turks expressed the hope that Erdogan would use his electoral mandate to intensify the AKP's reform agenda. They heralded proposals for a new constitution, implementation of Kurdish political and cultural rights, and abolition of regressive legislation, such as the antiterror act and article 301 of the penal code.
Improving economic conditions in the southeast is also part of the solution to the PKK problem. More investment is needed in infrastructure, such as roads and water works. Privatization and land reform would create jobs. Social development would be served by funding healthcare and education.
Sticks as well as carrots are required. Leaders of the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional governments have said all the right things, but they can do more to ratchet up the pressure on the PKK. Iraqi Kurds should use their leverage to arrange a 12-month cease-fire. This cooling off period would avert a wider war and give Erdogan time to move forward with reforms, draining the swamp of support for the PKK among Turkey's Kurds.
To prove it is serious, the Kurdistan Regional Government should target PKK logistics by replacing PKK checkpoints around its base in Iraq's Qandil mountains with Kurdistan Regional Government forces, interdicting PKK funds reputedly carried by air travelers to Erbil, and restricting the activities of groups in Iraqi Kurdistan that condone PKK violence.
The international community must also do its part by targeting the PKK's financing and propaganda infrastructure. To this end, the EU Counterterrorism Group should investigate illicit revenues and the UN Counterterrorism Committee request that member states report on efforts to cut off financing. In addition, the licenses for European-based PKK media outlets that incite hatred or endorse violence should be revoked.
More than 150,000 Turkish troops are massed on the Iraqi border. They threaten more than just the PKK. The troop buildup also serves as a warning to Iraqi Kurds on Kirkuk. Turkey adamantly opposes the oil-rich Kirkuk governorate joining the KRG. It believes that Kirkuk's accession could threaten the indivisibility of Turkey by triggering the emergence of a de facto independent state of Iraqi Kurdistan that would inspire the separatist ambitions of Turkish Kurds.
Turkey need not worry. Kurds overwhelmingly prefer to be a part of Europe than a landlocked "greater Kurdistan." In 2005, 83.3 percent responded affirmatively when asked about EU membership.
Moreover, Turkey may come to realize that a stable, secular, and pro-Western Iraqi Kurdistan is a useful buffer between it and an increasingly unstable and Islamicized Iraq. Good neighborly relations with Iraqi Kurdistan could also yield a windfall of economic benefits in the form of oil transport fees, water rights, construction deals, oil development contracts, and cross-border trade.
If the PKK makes the strategic decision that it wants peace, some sort of amnesty arrangement will be required. Amnesty is a repugnant notion to Turks whose emotions are riled daily by media reports of grieving families clutching pictures and wailing over coffins of loved ones victimized by the PKK. Without amnesty, however, Turkey will at best manage but never solve the PKK problem.
Amnesty would proceed in phases. First, PKK youth who joined after 2002 would be eligible. Cadres without command responsibility would be next. The 134 senior leaders who have been "red bulletined" by Interpol would be denied amnesty but could apply for asylum in their country of current residence. However much Turks demand justice, they will have to realize that PKK commanders are in a position to scuttle progress unless there is something in it for them.
The United States should impress upon Erdogan that restraint does not mean weakness. A peaceful resolution of the current crisis is in the interest of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States, which needs Turkey's assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as its moderating influence in the Muslim world.
David L. Phillips is project director of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and a visiting scholar at Columbia University's Center for Human Rights.
