The Saudi factor

Of course, young men taking their own lives to cause the brutal destruction seen on Sunday is not the sign of a healthy society. But these militants do not represent a severe threat to the Saudi elite. In fact, contemporary calls for change in Saudi Arabia -- whether from the Islamist militants or democratic reformers -- are much less widespread, and much less articulate, than those the Saudi kingdom has faced in the past.

Last weekend's attack seems less like a fresh salvo than a petulant last gasp of a movement capable of little more than announcing "we are still here" in the most destructive manner. The choice of target -- a compound inhabited mainly by Arabs -- was probably dictated by the group's weakness, and has been greeted with widespread revulsion throughout the country. Though no group has issued a credible claim of responsibility, the attack fits with the pattern of anonymous, nihilistic Islamist violence throughout the Middle East. Such attacks have as much to do with creating the opportunity for "martyrdom" as with presenting a direct political challenge to the status quo.

By contrast, the group responsible for the most significant Islamist assault in Saudi history made its aims very public. In 1979, inspired by the Iranian revolution, zealots seized control of the main mosque at Mecca, distributing pamphlets, booklets, and audio cassettes explaining their ideas and goals. Calling for a more egalitarian vision of Islam, they demanded a limit on the power of the Saudi royal family, a renegotiation of oil contracts with Western companies, and the removal of all foreign military advisers. Given the recent overthrow of the Shah, the Saudi regime initially responded with caution, leaving the militants in the mosques for weeks before finally eliminating them in a fierce firefight that killed hundreds.

As it turned out, the group, which consisted mostly of foreign religious students who had been studying at Saudi universities, was not popular in wider Saudi society. And at the height of Saudi Arabia's oil boom, their calls for the redistribution of wealth fell on deaf ears. Still, the Saudi elite's careful reaction to the Mecca uprising serves to underline how the militants' clear political agenda, and their identification with a nearby regional power, gave them clout.

The regime faces no such restraints today. Ever since the May 12 bombings that destroyed another residential compound and killed several Westerners, the Saudis have been swift and harsh in their crackdown on radical Islamists. Hundreds have been arrested, many suspects have died in battles with the police, and more than 1,000 state-employed clerics, considered too extremist, have been sent back to school for the Saudi equivalent of political reeducation. For all the recent talk of democracy and reform, there has been little visible popular opposition to the extra-judicial methods employed by security police. In fact, the public's passive acquiescence in the war against terrorism is the most important factor shaping Saudi politics today.

Not that all is well in the kingdom, where the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s has abetted a slow decline in living standards. According to World Bank estimates, Saudi per capita income fell by 2.9 percent per year between 1970-95. GNP fell by almost 35 percent in the same period, even as the population increased dramatically from 9 to 19 million. Economically, Saudis remain very dependent on the government for employment; 40 percent of the work force is state-employed, and despite attempts to reduce services an estimated 20 percent of household income still comes from government grants or aid. Unemployment for young men aged 20-24 stands at 27 percent.

But while the lavish lifestyles of the royal family may engender some grumbling from economically marginalized youth, the Saudis' experience of decline may in fact have undermined movements for reform. With their security already in question, the population has been unwilling to gamble on the destabilizing project of the Islamists. And while the project of democratization might lead to greater social parity in the future, it does little to address the population's more immediate economic concerns. The chaos in Iraq may only encourage belief in the need for a strong centralized state.

Compounding these low expectations is the political defeat of the last truly popular movement to haunt the Saudi elites: Arab nationalism. In the 1950s and `60s the streets of Saudi cities were rocked by groups inspired by the exploits of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and others. The royal family was put on the defensive, isolated in the region as conservative stooges of the colonialist Western powers. They faced numerous strikes, protests, and coup attempts, some initiated by their own military. But by the 1970s it became apparent that Nasser-style nationalism would not bring equality, prosperity, and economic independence from the West. With its failure, the population largely retreated from politics and shunned big ideas.

In fact, the greatest pressures on Saudi Arabia today are external. The relationship with the United States, built on shared interests in the flow of oil and the maintenance of stability, has been altered by the war on terror. Since it was discovered that 15 of the Sept. 11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, relations have been strained. Back in 2001, according to a series of high-profile leaks, the Bush administration seemed to toy with the idea of distancing itself from its ally. The regime seems to have been divided about what course of action to take, and despite the austere conservatism of its official Wahhabi religion, it initially denied any ties to radical Islamism. But since the Saudis were forced to wage their own war on terror by the militants last May, relations have strengthened once again. Recent exercises in democratic reform, such as the municipal elections promised for the future, have as much to do with fitting in with US regional priorities as they do with any upsurge of popular opposition.

Neither cult-like militants nor municipal elections will bring down the House of Saud. With continued White House backing, the Saudi state will remain stable for the foreseeable future. No doubt new challenges will one day emerge, but for the moment, as they say in Arabic, "Mashi-l hal" -- "Everything is OK," or more literally, and perhaps more suitably, "The situation is walking."

Nicholas Frayn is a Boston-area writer. He studied Saudi politics at St. Antony's College, Oxford.