US saw spread of nuclear arms as 'inevitable'

WASHINGTON -- During his first stint as secretary of defense three decades ago, Donald H. Rumsfeld received a grim intelligence assessment: The spread of atomic weapons is inevitable and there is virtually nothing the United States can do to stop it.

''The future," the secret December 1975 CIA estimate concluded, ''is likely to be characterized not only by an increased number but also an increased diversity of nuclear actors. These will include nuclear superpowers, regional nuclear powers, nuclear abstainers, closet nuclear powers, nuclear explosives powers, and, possibly, nuclear terrorists."

The document, declassified this summer along with a series of Cold War nuclear intelligence estimates, revealed a surprising truth about nuclear arms policy over the past three decades: The US government believed that dramatic increases in the number of nuclear actors on the world stage were ''inevitable."

Now, 60 years to the day after the United States dropped the first of two atomic bombs on Japan, eight countries are believed to possess nuclear weapons, up from seven 30 years ago. Only Pakistan became a nuclear power over the past three decades. North Korea also asserts it has weapons but has not conducted a test.

While the spread of nuclear weapons is alarming to many specialists in the age of terrorism, that worry may obscure the more promising fact that arms-control treaties have been largely successful.

''The nonproliferation record during the Cold War was surprisingly good," Robert McNamara, secretary of defense between 1961 and 1967, said in an interview last week. ''Our counter-proliferation efforts were very effective."

But now, McNamara and many other specialists worry that success may be in jeopardy because international agreements that have helped keep proliferation in check are receiving less attention in the United States and elsewhere.

They point out that the United States is pursuing new forms of nuclear weapons and recently agreed to supply India with nuclear technology, even though that nation has not signed any nonproliferation treaties. Those actions, specialists say, undermine the central premise of arms control -- that all nations must scale back their nuclear ambitions -- and make it harder to rein in Iran and North Korea.

Joseph Cirincione, director of nonproliferation studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that if Iran and North Korea cannot be brought into the international fold, more nations will pursue nuclear weapons.

''If we can stop these two countries we have a very good chance of stopping proliferation and even rolling it back," he said. ''If we get it wrong, then it goes the other way."

During the Cold War, US spies repeatedly warned of a world replete with nuclear powers. After the United States began the nuclear age in 1945, the Soviet Union followed four years later. Great Britain and France joined the nuclear club in the 1950s, followed by China, India, and Pakistan. Israel is estimated to have between 100 and 200 warheads, but neither admits nor denies having arms.

As early as June 1957, a national intelligence estimate concluded that ''over the next decade an increasing number of countries will obtain possession of nuclear weapons" and that ''effective control will be increasingly difficult to achieve."

The document was among the Cold War intelligence reports obtained by the National Security Archive in Washington through the Freedom of Information Act. The documents, which are slowly being analyzed by scholars, reveal that CIA analysts didn't believe that diplomacy would have much effect.

The 1975 analysis delivered to Rumsfeld said ''The materials and technology are already too widely available for technical safeguards and international regulations to be effective."

Nevertheless, beginning in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union began talks that led to agreements to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Those efforts expanded into international frameworks, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970.

Under the nonproliferation treaty the five nuclear powers at the time struck a bargain with the world's non-nuclear powers: If those without atomic bombs agreed not to pursue them, they would be eligible for civilian nuclear assistance for power plants. In return, the nuclear weapons states agreed to steadily move toward disarmament. To date, 187 countries have signed the pact. India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only nuclear powers that have not, while North Korea pulled out of the treaty last year.

Other agreements included the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in which 40 nations signed on to guidelines for exporting nuclear-related technologies.

Most of the agreements remained in force long after the Cold War ended, but commitment to them is wavering.

The United States and Russia no longer negotiate binding agreements to reduce their arsenals. The Moscow Treaty, signed in 2002, does not require the destruction of any stockpiles and only pledges both sides to reduce ''deployed" weapons.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, is researching a new class of nuclear weapons to strike underground targets, saying it may need them in future wars.

At a meeting in New York in May marking the 35th anniversary of the nonproliferation treaty, the United States -- not Iran and North Korea -- became the main target of criticism that it failed to meet its commitment to move toward disarmament.

Then, in late July, Bush reversed 30 years of policy by agreeing to sell India sensitive civilian nuclear technology. US policy had long prohibited any nuclear assistance to countries that have refused to sign the treaty. Many fear the move will be seen as rewarding India and could lead other countries to relax their own rules for sharing materials.

''It is not adequately recognized for the damage it is apt to do to the nonproliferation regime," William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, said of the new US-India agreement. ''It is a potential watershed event where the United States has jettisoned a quarter century of policy."

The White House, however, maintains that India is in a different class than Iran or North Korea. The US statement of July 18 stated ''that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states."

The Bush administration's signature effort is also outside the international arms-control framework. The Proliferation Security Initiative is an ad hoc collection of countries set up to interdict potentially dangerous shipments. The administration maintains that the treaties aren't working.

John Bolton, US ambassador to the United Nations, said last year that ''the Bush administration is making up for decades of stillborn plans, wishful thinking, and irresponsible passivity," chiding previous administrations for a ''fascination with arms-control agreements."

Bryan Bender can be reached at bender@globe.com.