WASHINGTON - Most people are familiar with the litany of apology and expiation expected of a political aide who says something unwise or unwarranted.
So when Barack Obama's foreign policy adviser Samantha Power donned the hairshirt on Friday for having called Hillary Clinton a monster - "I'm just truly sorry at the harm it must have caused her" - the ritual was predictable to most political observers.
But, of course, anyone who follows politics knows that Clinton's camp was probably delighted - not pained - to learn that an Obama adviser had gone off the rails. Ultimately, all the faux outrage would serve to call attention to the Obama campaign's negativity and give Clinton more leeway for her own attacks - and overshadow similar gaffes by Clinton aides earlier in the race.
But if there was a warning for the Obama campaign, it was not about the dangers of negative campaigning. It was about the importance of having a consistent message and an effective chain of command.
Power was the third Obama adviser to stir up a cloud of dust in recent weeks by apparently substituting his or her own views for Obama's: In addition to the "monster" comment, made to a Scottish newspaper, Power told the BBC that Obama's plan to withdraw all troops from Iraq within 16 months was subject to change once he took office.
Susan Rice, another foreign policy aide, committed the misstep of opining that neither Obama nor Clinton was ready to handle a 3 a.m. phone call announcing a foreign policy crisis. Rice probably meant that no one can be fully prepared for the burdens of the presidency, but John McCain was only too happy to jump on her words and announce that he, at least, feels up to the job.
Perhaps most damaging of all, Austan Goolsbee, a University of Chicago economist advising Obama, apparently sought to reassure Canadian officials in the days leading up to the Ohio primary that the senator wasn't really as critical of the North American Free Trade Agreement as he sounded on the stump. A memo produced by the Canadian consulate in Chicago suggested that Goolsbee felt the heated antitrade rhetoric was "political maneuvering."
The actions of Obama's advisers raise as many questions about Obama as about the advisers.
The first is the obvious one: whether he truly intends to follow through on what he's been saying. For most of the campaign, Obama has gotten good mileage out of the idea that he says what he believes while Clinton's plans are hedged to allow for extra maneuverability. But in Obama's effort to stay to Clinton's left on Iraq and NAFTA, he may have gone further than he wanted, or could deliver.
When Clinton, during the Ohio debate, promised to opt out of the trade deal if Canada and Mexico didn't agree to changes, Obama quickly agreed. He later referred to using "the hammer of potential opt-out" to enhance environmental and labor requirements in NAFTA.
Obama may well believe that, and he may intend to stick with his timetable for a withdrawal from Iraq no matter what happens. But if so, he needs to make sure that all his advisers remain with the program.
"Message control" is a common catchphrase among political consultants, but it is crucial to governing as well. And when recent administrations have had problems with message control, it has usually signaled some sort of weakness in the boss.
Ronald Reagan is well-remembered as a man of simple, unshakable beliefs, but he left so many policy details unsettled that his aides - particularly in his first term, when Secretary of State Al Haig feuded with an array of White House advisers - were constantly vying for supremacy.
Bill Clinton had the opposite problem. He was so committed to brainstorming that scraps of internal debates kept leaking out in ways that undermined his policies.
What Bill Clinton ultimately learned - and Obama may well be learning - is that when advisers feel the boss is either unsure of himself or too persuadable, they won't hesitate to make their views public. Since advisers are constantly jockeying among themselves, each wants to have his or her voice heard.
Obama may have inadvertently furthered this problem by sending some of his foreign policy advisers on group tours, trying to showcase the substance and experience of his team. In the process, some of them may have forgotten that only one person should be setting foreign policy for the Obama campaign, and that person is Barack Obama.
Peter S. Canellos is the Globe's Washington bureau chief. National Perspective is his weekly analysis of events in the capital and beyond.
