A gamble for the superdelegates
DEMOCRATS are casting about, trying to find the scoring system that ends their nominating process before their convention with the fewest bad feelings. A variety of solutions has been floated: delegate counts, states won, popular vote, and national polls.
Surprisingly, this political drama might have produced a rational outcome: The nominating process will probably be decided by the Democratic superdelegates.
These delegates are "super" because they are the warrior class of the party. They know strategy and tactics. Electability matters to these people.
Somewhere, just under the chatter over delegate counts and alienated supporters, the superdelegates have to be looking at the Electoral College and the handful of key states as to which candidate will run better against John McCain.
It's the political equivalent of war games: Take the 35 traditionally "red" and "blue" states and remove them from the table. When these states are divided up, the Democrats lead 190-174.
The remaining 15 states are the battleground and are most likely to determine the Electoral College winner. Seven of those states, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, West Virginia, Virginia, and Florida can be categorized as "Lean Republican" and carry 80 electoral votes. Four states, Minnesota, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire are in the "Lean Democrat" category and represent 52 votes. Four states, New Mexico, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio are pure toss-ups and have 42 votes.
For those keeping score, in order to carry the Electoral College, the Democrats need 80 votes from the battleground states, the Republicans, 96. The best way of projecting what might happen in those states in 2008 is to match the candidates against each other in terms of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.
Assume the Bush vote is the McCain vote in those 15 states. Perhaps add a few more votes from Hispanics because of McCain's immigration position.
Assume Hillary Clinton will be viewed as a northern state liberal: a combination of John Kerry and Al Gore. The states-won distribution between Gore and Kerry was identical except for New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Iowa. If Clinton starts the race as the Kerry/Gore prototype in the battleground states, she will probably run a very close election with McCain, just like Bush-Gore and Bush-Kerry. The problem for her is that both Gore and Kerry lost. The question is: Which states can she flip and why?
Obama is harder to profile. The enthusiasm for his campaign, his appeal among younger voters, suburban independents, and African-Americans prompts some analysts to suggest that not only can't he be categorized, but that his presence on the ballot against McCain will throw 40 states into play instead of the traditional handful. However, the split between Whites and African-Americans in choosing between Obama and Clinton has been stark, now fueled by Obama's recent comments about small town America. The flipside of the Obama potential is the potential backlash against the first African-American nominee.
Then there are the wildcards. Is there a state changing its demographics so quickly that it shifts parties no matter who the candidate is (Colorado)? Will the selection of a vice presidential nominee tip a state one direction or another (Minnesota with Republican Governor Tim Pawlenty, Ohio with Democratic Governor Ted Strickland, Pennsylvania with Democratic Governor Edward G. Rendell)? Will there be pockets of conservative white Democrats in the industrial states of Michigan, Ohio or Pennsylvania who voted for Gore and Kerry but will vote for a Republican over either a woman or an African-American?
In Clinton, the superdelegates have a candidate who fits their recent mold and the last two elections have been very close. This year is a bad year for Republicans. Just a slight shift from the Gore-Kerry level would give her the victory. In Obama they have a new model candidate and the potential for a coalition of voter groups and states which break from the Gore-Kerry model.
Superdelegates are the most practical individuals going to the Democratic Convention. Practical people don't like to gamble much in their decision-making. The superdelegates have to ask themselves how much they want to roll the dice.
David Sparks is assistant to the dean of the McCormack School of Policy Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He held senior positions on the 1980 and 1988 Bush for President campaigns.
