Intelligence failures cited in 9/11 report

WASHINGTON -- The final report by the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks details as many as 10 missed opportunities by the Bush and Clinton administrations to detect or derail the terrorist hijackings, but the panel stops short of saying the attacks should have been prevented, according to government officials and others familiar with the document.

The report, to be released publicly tomorrow, includes a list of 10 ''operational opportunities" that the government missed to potentially unravel the Sept. 11 plot, according to a government official who has read the document. Six of the incidents listed came during the Bush administration and four were during the Clinton years, the official said.

But the nearly 600-page report also acknowledges that many of the opportunities were long shots and that others would have required a lucky sequence of events to alter the outcome, according to sources who declined to be identified because the commission wants the document kept secret until tomorrow.

Another government official who has been briefed on the report said the tally of missed opportunities includes the CIA's failure to add two hijackers' names to a terrorism watchlist; the FBI's handling of the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, who has been accused of conspiring in the plot; and several failed attempts to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. The report also notes, however, the inherent difficulties intelligence agencies have in assembling a clear picture of a terrorist threat, one official said.

The list of missed opportunities is the latest in a series of revelations to emerge in recent days about the final report of the panel, known formally as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The report details a series of broad government failures in connection with the Sept. 11 plot and recommends a wide-ranging restructuring that would include a Cabinet-level intelligence director to oversee the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.

The report also concludes that Al Qaeda's relationship with Iran and its client, the Hezbollah militant group, was far deeper and more longstanding than its links with Iraq, which never established operational ties with the terrorist group, according to officials familiar with the document.

Among the newest findings is evidence, disclosed in media reports this week, that as many as 10 of the Sept. 11 hijackers transited through Iran prior to the hijackings.

Over its 20-month history, the 10-member commission has tread carefully on the overarching question of whether the Sept. 11 attacks could have been, or should have been, prevented. The panel's two leaders, Republican chairman Thomas H. Kean and Democratic vice chairman Lee H. Hamilton, have said at various times that the attacks could conceivably have been thwarted, but have stopped short of saying prevention was likely or reasonable.

The panel decided several months ago that it would not include such a definitive judgment in its final report, according to one commission member interviewed this week. Rather, this commissioner said, the decision was made to outline the opportunities that were missed while acknowledging the tenacity and adaptability of Al Qaeda in reaching its goal.