The public politics of intelligence reports
PRESIDENT BUSH'S decision to declassify portions of a recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and terrorism is unfortunate. The publication of the estimate will not lead to a more informed public debate, nor will it help to improve the quality of intelligence. Instead, the intelligence community will come under pressure to make sure its views are politically convenient.
The president's decision came after parts of the estimate were leaked over the weekend, leading to a storm of controversy over the administration's strategy. Congressional leaders from both parties called for the estimate to be released after the story came out.
For Democrats, the estimate is a damning indictment of the White House because it concludes that the war in Iraq has made terrorism worse. For Republicans, the estimate demonstrates signs of progress in the war on terrorism. They blame the media for presenting a simplified and misleading picture of current intelligence, and hope that releasing the estimate will block efforts to undermine the president.
A similar push is underway to release intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program. Hawks, who are sure that Iran is going nuclear, want the intelligence community to find the evidence. Doves, who are less certain of Iran's actions, want to release intelligence to the public so that it will quiet the drumbeat of war. They believe that the intelligence on Iran is ambiguous and would not justify another war in the Middle East.
The calls for releasing intelligence on Iraq and Iran are symptomatic of larger trend. There is a growing chorus of critics who want intelligence to become more transparent. Partisans from both sides of the aisle want to use intelligence against one another. Foreign policy activists want to use intelligence to shape public opinion. And critics of the intelligence community argue that classification is mostly a form of bureaucratic protection. As long as intelligence products are insulated from public scrutiny, they argue, intelligence agencies are spared from accountability.
But the rush toward glasnost is profoundly dangerous. Intelligence helps guide policy by producing unvarnished assessments of foreign affairs. This sometimes means delivering estimates that are contrary to leaders' beliefs and preferences. Policy makers will not accept bad news in good faith when they fear that the same intelligence will be used against them in public. They certainly will not to help create a hospitable environment for honest analysis.
For their part, intelligence officials must offer candid judgments while staying outside the political fray. Leaking their findings to the press destroys the mutual trust that is needed to sustain a productive dialogue between the producers and consumers of intelligence. A useful relationship between the administration and the intelligence community requires a commitment to secrecy on both sides.
Publicizing intelligence almost always damages that relationship. The Johnson administration clashed with the CIA when the agency refused to support reports about progress in Vietnam. The Nixon administration pressured the CIA to provide intelligence that justified its plans to develop a new missile defense system. Both episodes created lasting hostility between policy makers and intelligence officials.
The debacle over the estimate of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should also give pause to those who call for the publication of current intelligence. Critics wanted to see the estimate so that they could decide whether to support the president. But the published version of the estimate was more of a brochure for the war than a professional approximation of a potential threat. This was hardly surprising. The administration had no reason to publicize intelligence unless it was sure that the estimate supported the case for war.
The fallout from Iraq is still being felt. The president has been called as a liar for exaggerating the threat, and the intelligence community has been portrayed as incompetent. Neither side has reason to trust the other.
Declassifying new estimates will only make the problem worse. As the gap between the White House and the intelligence community widens, policy makers will have less reason to incorporate intelligence into their decision-making process. Intelligence is supposed to provide information on important military and political trends, and act as a check on policy makers' assumptions and beliefs. Forcing intelligence into the public arena will make it almost impossible to perform these roles.
Calls for greater transparency are understandable because they are consistent with the principles of open government and public accountability. But transparency has a down side. When policy makers know that estimates are going to influence the public debate over foreign policy, they will be strongly tempted to force intelligence officials to change their views. Releasing intelligence on controversial issues is a recipe for politicization.
Joshua Rovner, a doctoral candidate in the MIT Security Studies Program, is a Stanley Kaplan fellow in leadership studies at Williams College. 
