Beware the biolab
RECENTLY, THE Associated Press and the Globe reported that the number of accidents in laboratories handling deadly germs and toxins has been increasing as the number of labs working with these agents has grown. This report noted that these accidents (many of which had been previously unreported) "reflect poorly on procedures and oversight at high-security labs," such as the Boston University biolab being built in the South End.
Nevertheless, many proponents of the BU biolab - including representatives of the National Institutes of Health and the university itself - continue to report that the operations of the laboratory will not pose any health risk to the surrounding community. Although the agents to be studied include Ebola and other potentially fatal germs, the NIH has repeatedly stated that its assessments of the risks associated with the laboratory demonstrate "that the operation of the [laboratory will] not pose a risk to the community in which the laboratory [is] sited or to the surrounding communities."
The NIH does, however, admit that in spite of these assessments and repeated assurances, "lingering concerns" have been "raised by some members of the community regarding the potential public health risks that could result from a release of exotic infectious agents." At times, it appears that these community-based concerns have been dismissed as simply being the result of "Not in My Backyard" syndrome or extreme, irrational fear.
A careful analysis of the NIH risk assessments suggests that the concerns of many biolab opponents are the result of legitimate and well-founded fears. In part, these concerns and fears have been exacerbated by the errors, omissions, and inadequacies of the NIH risk assessments themselves.
One source of these concerns is that the NIH assessments do not include any systematic analysis of the likelihoods of potentially harmful events. Although the NIH and the BU Medical Center appear to have designed the biolab and its operating procedures to reduce the chance of potentially harmful events, these likelihoods can not be zero. Accidents and operational failures are likely to occur at some time during the 40-year life of the facility.
A second source of concern is that there are several major and as yet, uncorrected errors in analyses underlying the risk assessments. For example, the laboratory accident leading to a release of anthrax spores in the reportedly "worst-case" risk assessment is described as the dropping of a glass container from a laboratory bench, a fall of roughly 36 inches. But the NIH experiment that formed the basis for the estimated number of anthrax spores released from this type of accident only evaluated the results of dropping a container 15 inches, an accident that would clearly result in the release of far fewer spores.
Another important source of concern is the lack of caution used in arriving at the assumptions underlying the various risk assessments. For example, in arriving at the assumption of the number of inhaled anthrax spores likely to cause disease or death, the authors of the "worst-case assessment" note that "while the precise dose of . . . spores required to cause human pulmonary anthrax is not known . . . for purposes of this report we are relying on the most cautious published evidence (a 1966 article), which suggests that the [disease causing] level is greater than 500 spores breathed."
More recent publications indicate that much smaller inhaled doses of anthrax can be lethal and even smaller doses can cause disease. For example, in 2002, scientists at the Center for Biodefense at the University of Texas reported that "a dosage of 14 to 28 spores is likely to cause death to 5 percent of exposed animals." The authors of this study note that "extrapolation of (animal) data to man is difficult, (but) the rather low numbers (of spores causing death) suggest caution is in order." The use of an estimate from an old report suggests caution was not a major factor in establishing the assumptions underlying the NIH assessment.
In summary, failure of the NIH risk assessments to reduce or eliminate the "lingering" concerns and fears is not simply the result of the opponents' NIMBYism or paranoia.
Unless the assessments are expanded, corrected, and based on appropriate levels of caution, the fears and concerns of biolab opponents will not be addressed. Perhaps, improved risk assessments will indicate that the biolab will not create unreasonable levels of risk. But in the absence of improved assessments, caution suggests that an insistence on NIMBE - No Injuries to My Boston Environment - is an appropriate basis for opposing the proposed biolab.
David Mundel formerly served as assistant director of the Congressional Budget Office and director of Boston's Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency. He is currently an independent consultant who lives in the South End.
