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Staffing, response times in fires where firefighters died

To examine staffing levels and response times in fires where firefighters died, The Boston Globe compiled these facts from federal investigative reports on firefighters who died in structure fires from 1997-2004. Excluded were deaths from wildfires, motor vehicle accidents, heart attacks and other causes not directly involving a structure fire.

The newspaper found that most firefighters who die fighting a fire were working in substandard conditions, arriving too late with too few people. And most were going into buildings where there was no one to save. Out of 52 fires that killed 80 firefighters, in only 35 of the 52 fires could the department get even one firefighter to the scene within 6 minutes. In only 27 of the fires could four firefighters muster within 6 minutes, the minimum attack force recommended by the National Fire Protection Association. And in only 18 of the fires did a full force of 15 firefighters arrive within 10 minutes, the manpower standard for safe and effective work at a basic building fire.

This also stood out: the needlessness of the loss. In only 14 of the fires was there even a suspicion that someone might be inside. In all the rest, firefighters were let into a locked building by the owner or were told by occupants or first responders that the building was empty. In only six of the 52 fires was there actually anyone in the building.

The basic facts listed below on each fire come from the US Fire Administration's firefighter fatality database.

The staffing information comes from investigations by the CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. In many cases the Globe looked up additional information on response times in the National Fire Incident Reporting System database, and telephoned fire departments for incident reports.

The recommended staffing levels here those used by the National Fire Protection Association. The NFPA applies these standards only to fire departments with primarily full-time firefighters, but the Globe applied the same measure to every fire response.

More information on the Globe's investigation of fire response times is at Boston.com/fires, including an Excel spreadsheet file with the information on this page.

Please send any questions to Bill Dedman, at Dedman@Globe.com.

Williams, Charles H

Age: 29
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Lexington Fire Department, Lexington, Kentucky
Status: Career
Incident date: 02/17/97
Minutes to first responder arriving: 5
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 15
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 15+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside: No
Type of building: Single-family home
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 02/17/97
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Williams and a second firefighter became trapped after entering a residential fire and falling through a hole into the basement. Both received second and third degree burns. Efforts were made to revive Williams on the scene. The other firefighter was admitted to the hospital with serious burns.

NIOSH recommendations: "Fire departments should ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure at least four fire fighters be on the scene before initiating interior fire fighting operations at a working structural fire. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, be equipped with two-way communications with incident command."

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Seguin, Michael L

Age: 31
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Buffalo Fire Department, Buffalo, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 07/04/97
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 4
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): N/A
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Residence
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 07/04/97
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Seguin was killed when he became trapped by a roof collapse while fighting a residential structure fire. One other firefighter was injured and suffered second degree burns. The second firefighter was dragged to safety after becoming unconscious. Rescuers did not see Firefighter Seguin due to heavy smoke and he was not located until later that afternoon. Fire officials stated that there was a possibility that the fire was started by fireworks.

NIOSH recommendations: "Fire departments should ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should strictly enforce the wearing and use of PASS devices when fire fighters are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duties. Fire departments should develop and implement written maintenance procedures for the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Sammons, Jeffrey E

Age: 21
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: South Whitley Fire Department, South Whitley, Ind.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 08/19/97
Minutes to first responder arriving: 7
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): N/A
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Restaurant/tavern
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 08/19/97
Property type: Public Assembly

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Sammons was killed and two others were injured in a restaurant fire caused by cooking equipment that had been left on. Sammons and others were making an internal fire attack when the heat buildup became extreme. They started to exit the structure when a flashover occurred causing some of the ceiling tile to fall.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that defensive (exterior operation) fire fighting tactics are suspended prior to switching the strategic mode of operation to an offensive strategy (interior fire attack with hand lines), and notify all affected personnel of the change in strategic modes. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, be equipped with two-way communications with incident command. Fire departments should establish and implement an incident-management system with written standard operating procedures for all fire fighters.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Hynes, James E

Age: 27
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Philadelphia Fire Department, Philadelphia, Pa.
Status: Career
Incident date: 10/27/97
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 3
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 3
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Duplex
Cause of death: Exposure
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 10/27/97
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Lt. McElveen and Firefighter Hynes died as a result of smoke inhalation at the scene of a residential structure fire. The fire was a result of wires that had come down on the roof during a heavy rain. The firefighters were operating in the interior of a two-story occupied dwelling with a fire in the basement. They both ran out of air, removed their SCBA masks,and remianed inside the dwelling. The two firefighters were found near the back door with their SCBA's on, but their masks off.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters advise dispatch on any change of conditions that would warrant a change in the status of unit(s) responding to a specific condition. Fire departments should strictly enforce the wearing and use of PASS devices when fire fighters are involved in fire fighting, rescue, and other hazardous duties.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

McElveen, Terry K

Age: 43
Sex: Male
Rank: Lieutenant
Department: Philadelphia Fire Department, Philadelphia, Pa.
Status: Career
Incident date: 10/27/97
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 3
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 3
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Duplex
Cause of death: Exposure
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 10/27/97
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Carter, Gregory Scott

Age: 24
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Fairlea Volunteer Fire Department, Fairlea, W.Va.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 01/21/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 16
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 0
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Supermarket
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 01/21/98
Property type: Store/Office

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Carter responded to a report of smoke in a supermarket. The market was contained in a strip mall which also included a post office and a photo-processing store. Firefighter Carter had been employed at the supermarket in the past. Firefighter Carter and a Captain entered the front of the store in full protective clothing and SCBA to search for the fire. They became disoriented while trying to exit the store. The Captain alerted other firefighters by radio that he and Firefighter Carter were lost and in need of rescue. Firefighter Carter ran out of air and placed the breathing tube from his SCBA into his coat in an attempt to breathe. The Captain was able to escape without significant injury. Immediate attempts were made by on scene firefighters to rescue Firefighter Carter but rescuers were driven back by intense heat and smoke. Firefighter Carter was wearing a PASS device but it was not turned on. No hose line or search rope was used. The cause of death was smoke and soot inhalation, carbon monoxide poisoning, and complete body charring. This was an accidental fire caused by an electrical malfunction in a wall.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, be equipped with safety lines or a hose line. Fire departments should strictly enforce the wearing and use of PASS devices when fire fighters are involved in fire fighting, rescue, and other hazardous duties. Fire departments should implement an incident management system with written procedures for all fire fighters. Fire departments should ensure that backup personnel are standing by with equipment, ready to provide assistance or rescue.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Carletti, Stephen D.

Age: 43
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Crooksville Volunteer Fire Department, Crooksville, Ohio
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 02/05/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 16
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 0
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Single-family home
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 02/05/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Carletti and Firefighter Theisen responded to a report of a fire in the basement of a single story home. They entered the basement with other firefighters and extinguished fire in the ceiling. In the process of moving around the basement, the attack line was pinched off when it was caught in a folding chair. Firefighters were not aware that their water supply had been cut off. When they began to pull additional ceiling tiles, the room experienced a flashover. Of the five firefighters in the basement when the flashover occurred, two escaped, one was rescued, and two were killed. An adjacent room, which had not been discovered by the firefighters, was fully involved in fire and fire spread to the other room when tiles were removed. Repeated radio requests for help and water were received from the basement but rescuers were unable to reach the firefighters in distress due to severe heat and fire. Both firefighters were wearing their PASS devices, they were turned on, and they activated. The fire cause was determined to be accidental. Firefighter Carletti died as the result of a crushing injury and Firefighter Theisen died of asphyxiation and burns. Firefighter Theisen was also a career firefighter in Westerville. The Crooksville Fire Department suffered a firefighter fatality in 1997.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should utilize the first arriving engine company as the command company and conduct an initial scene survey. Fire departments should implement an incident command system with written standard operating procedures for all fire fighters. Fire departments should provide a back-up hose crew. Fire departments should provide adequate on-scene communications including fireground tactical channels. Fire departments should train fire fighters in the various essentials of how to operate in smoke-filled environments, basement fire operations, dangers of ceiling collapse, ventilation practices, utilizing a second hoseline during fire attack, and identifying pre-backdraft, rollover, and flashover conditions. Fire departments should appoint an Incident Safety Officer.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Theisen, David Paul

Age: 29
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Crooksville Volunteer Fire Department, Crooksville, Ohio
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 02/05/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 16
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 0
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Single-family home
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 02/05/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

King, Patrick Joseph

Age: 40
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Chicago Fire Department, Chicago, Ill.
Status: Career
Incident date: 02/11/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 20+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 20+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Commercial tire service center
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 02/11/98
Property type: Store/Office

Summary by USFA: Firefighter King and Firefighter Lockhart responded on different companies to a report of a structural fire in a tire shop. No visible fire was encountered, there was no excessive heat, and only light smoke was found in most of the building with heavier smoke in the shop area. Ten firefighters were in the interior of the structure when an event that has been described as a flashover or backdraft occurred. The firefighters were disoriented by the effects of the backdraft. Some were able to escape but Firefighter King and Firefighter Lockhart were trapped in the structure. A garage door that self-operated due to fire exposure may have introduced oxygen into the fire area and may have been a factor in the backdraft. The exit efforts of firefighters were complicated by congestion in the building. Within minutes of the backdraft, the building was completely involved in fire and rescue efforts were impossible. Both firefighters died from carbon monoxide poisoning due to inhalation of smoke and soot.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that command conducts an initial evaluation of the incident scene upon arrival at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure command decision to ventilate a truss roof is based on conditions upon arrival. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters do not enter structures during ventilation where there is a potential for built-up explosive gases to ignite and cause a backdraft or flashover as evidenced by smoke-stained windows at the rear of the building and puffing smoke at the roof vents and rear windows. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting ventilation on the roof are in communication with command. Fire departments should encourage municipalities to review and amend their building codes as applicable regarding exposed polystyrene insulation.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Lockhart, Anthony Eddie

Summary by USFA: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Dupee, Joseph Charles

Age: 38
Sex: Male
Rank: Captain
Department: Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles. Calif.
Status: Career
Incident date: 03/08/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 20+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 20+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Dog treats preparation facility
Cause of death: Exposure
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 03/08/98
Property type: N/A

Summary by USFA: Captain Dupee and his company were dispatched to a structure fire in a pet food processing company and were assigned to backup interior crews. When fire conditions worsened, all firefighters exited the building with the exception of Captain Dupee who had somehow been separated from his crew. The situation was further complicated by the activation of an emergency signal by another firefighter that had become disoriented (he was rescued by his company officer). Shortly after firefighters left the building, a partial roof collapse occurred. When it was determined that Captain Dupee was missing, a rapid intervention crew forced entry in the rear of the structure and removed Captain Dupee. He was burned over 95% of his body, was provided with advanced life support care, and pronounced dead at the hospital. The cause of death was determined to be asphyxiation and burns. The fire was accidental and started as a grease fire in a convection oven.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain during operation at an incident. Fire departments should ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure communications are established between the interior and exterior attack crews, e.g., the ventilation crew and the interior fire attack crew should communicate conditions among themselves and with Incident Command. Fire departments should ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams be established and in position immediately upon arrival at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure that some type of tone or alert be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters. Fire departments should ensure sufficient personnel are available and properly functioning communications equipment are available to adequately support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes. Fire departments should consider placing a bright, narrow-beamed light at the entry portal to a structure to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency egress.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Blackmore, James W

Age: 48
Sex: Male
Rank: Lieutenant
Department: New York City Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 06/05/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 21
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 27+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: residential complex
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 06/06/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Along with other firefighters, Lieutenant Blackmore and Captain LaPiedra were conducting a search on the second floor of a commercial/residential structure. A civilian fire victim had been reported to be trapped in the area. Without warning, the second floor collapsed into the fire area on the first floor, trapping firefighters in a live fire on the first floor. Two firefighters died and four were seriously injured. The civilian fire victim had escaped through a back entrance. Lieutenant Blackmore was pronounced dead at the hospital after being recovered by other firefighters, the cause of death was crushing trauma and burns resulting in a heart attack. Captain LaPiedra suffered severe burns (70%) and died on July 4, 1998, the cause of death was thermal burns resulting in cardiac arrest.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident. Fire departments should ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure that some type of tone or alert that is recognized by all fire fighters be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters. Fire departments should ensure that Rapid Intervention Crews/Teams or Firefighter Assist and Search Teams (FAST Truck) are in place in the early stages of an incident. Fire departments should ensure that communication used on the fireground, e.g., handie-talkies, will remain operational in the event that one unit malfunctions. Municipalities should ensure that all modifications/renovations to buildings are in compliance with current building codes, i.e., any renovation or remodeling does not decrease the structural integrity of supporting members.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

LaPiedra, Scott J

Age: 40
Sex: Male
Rank: Captain
Department: New York City Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 06/05/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 21
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 27+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: residential complex
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 07/04/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Melton, Justin Allen

Age: 21
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Marks Volunteer Fire Department, Marks, Miss.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 08/29/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 8+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Commercial building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 08/29/98
Property type: Store/Office

Summary by USFA: Firefighters Melton and Selby were working in different areas of a structure fire that involved a commercial building. A collapse occurred which trapped Firefighter Melton as he and other firefighters were advancing a hoseline on the fire. Firefighter Selby was on the roof of the fire structure attempting ventilation when he fell into the fire area and was killed. Both firefighters died of asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should use defensive firefighting tactics when they do not have adequate apparatus, equipment and training. Fire departments should ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained. Fire departments should establish and implement an Incident Command System (ICS) with written standard operating procedures for all fire fighters. Fire departments should ensure those fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, are equipped with two-way communications with incident command. Fire departments should establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for fire fighters who conduct vertical ventilation. Fire departments should ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams be established and in position immediately upon arrival at the fire scene. Fire departments should strictly enforce the wearing and use of PASS devices when fire fighters are involved in fire fighting, rescue, and other hazardous duties. Fire departments should ensure adequate personal protective equipment is available while fire fighters are engaged in fire activity. Owners of commercial buildings should ensure that smoke alarms and sprinkler systems are installed and operable.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Selby, Scott

Age: 35
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Marks Volunteer Fire Department, Marks, Miss.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 08/29/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 8+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Commercial building
Cause of death: Fell or jumped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Ventilation
Death date: 08/29/98
Property type: Store/Office

Summary by USFA: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

McDonough, Eugene P

Age: 54
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: St. Johnsbury Fire Department, St. Johnsbury, Vt.
Status: Career
Incident date: 09/05/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 5
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 9
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 9
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse of recycled paper
Cause of death: Struck by or contact with object
Nature of death: Internal trauma
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 09/05/98
Property type: Storage

Summary by USFA: Firefighter McDonough responded with other members of his Department to a mutual aid fire in a recycling facility. While opening a large door to allow a master stream attack, Firefighter McDonough was crushed when a parapet wall collapsed. The cause of the fire was arson.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that pre-fire planning and inspections cover all structural building materials/components and exterior walls. Fire departments should establish a collapse zone around buildings that have parapet walls that could collapse.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Blizzard, Robby Dean

Age: 24
Sex: Male
Rank: Lieutenant
Department: Arrington Volunteer Fire Department, Dudley, N.C.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 11/06/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 1
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 5
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: auto salvage storage building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 11/06/98
Property type: Storage

Summary by USFA: Chief Jones and First Lieutenant Blizzard were killed as fought a fire in an automobile salvage yard storage building. Firefighters believed that they had found the seat of the fire and were applying water when a rapid change in conditions occurred. Chief Jones ran out of air while trying to escape. Lieutenant Blizzard entered the structure to search for Chief Jones. He ran out of air, became disoriented, and failed to exit the building. Lieutenant Blizzard was wearing a PASS device but it was not activated. Chief Jones was not equipped with a PASS device. The cause of death for Chief Jones was listed as carbon monoxide poisoning and smoke inhalation and the cause of death for Lieutenant Blizzard was listed as carbon monoxide poisoning. Lieutenant Blizzard was also a career firefighter in another community but was off duty at the time.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure that vertical ventilation takes place to release any heat and smoke directly above the fire. Fire departments should ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams be established and in position. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear and use PASS devices when involved in interior fire fighting and other hazardous duties.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Jones, Hubert Sidney

Age: 29
Sex: Male
Rank: Volunteer
Department: Arrington Volunteer Fire Department, Dudley, N.C.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 11/06/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 1
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 5
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: auto salvage storage building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 11/06/98
Property type: Storage

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Bohan, James E

Age: 25
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: New York City Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/18/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 24+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 24+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: apartment building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 12/18/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Bohan, Firefighter Bopp, and Lieutenant Cavalieri were killed while fighting a residential high rise structure fire. As they rushed to the tenth floor to search for victims, they were overcome by a wave of heat and smoke that killed all three. The heat wave, or fireball, may have been propelled by a gust of wind coming through the fire apartment. The automatic closing device on the apartment door had been removed or had malfunctioned. The building's hallway sprinklers did not activate due to a closed valve. Six firefighters were injured in the fire.

NIOSH recommendations: Municipalities, city housing authorities, and building owners should ensure that buildings equipped with sprinkler systems are operational. Municipalities, city housing authorities, and building owners should consider early warning systems for timely notification of fire. Fire departments should ensure communications on the fireground are utilized and recorded, especially between fire fighters in IDLH situations and Incident Command. Fire departments should ensure that the standpipe hookup is on the floor below the fire.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Bopp, Christopher Michael

Age: 27
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: New York City Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/18/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 24+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 24+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: apartment building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 12/18/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Cavalieri, Joseph P

Age: 42
Sex: Male
Rank: Lieutenant
Department: New York City Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/18/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 24+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 24+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: apartment building
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 12/18/98
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Williams, Kennon Loy

Age: 27
Sex: Male
Rank: Captain
Department: Banks County Volunteer Fire Department, Homer, Ga.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 12/31/98
Minutes to first responder arriving: 10
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 6
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Church
Cause of death: Struck by or contact with object
Nature of death: Internal trauma
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 12/31/98
Property type: Public Assembly

Summary by USFA: Captain Williams and other members of his Department were conducting an offensive attack on an arson fire of a church built around 1850. Captain Williams was caught under heavy timbers in a roof collapse.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that pre-fire planning and inspections cover all structural building materials (type and age), components, and renovations so Incident Command at the fire scene will have necessary background information on the structure to make informed decisions and appropriate plan of attack. Fire departments should ensure that defensive fire fighting tactics are suspended prior to switching the strategic mode of operation to an offensive attack to avoid opposing streams, and notify all affected personnel of the change in strategic modes. Fire departments should ensure fire fighting tactics and operations do not increase hazards on the interior, e.g., hose streams being directed into concealed ceiling spaces which will add additional weight to the structure, possibly causing structural failure. Fire departments should ensure that all standard operating procedures (SOPs) are updated and adequate for incident command and fireground operations and that all officers and fire fighters are trained and knowledgeable in all SOPs. Fire departments should ensure that all officers and fire fighters wear and use a personal alert safety system (PASS) device that are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duty.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Gouckenour, Jason A

Age: 22
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Worthington-Jefferson Township Volunteer Fire Department, Worthington, Ind.
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 01/09/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 12
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 0
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 2
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Single-family home
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 01/09/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Gouckenour entered a structural fire in a house alone with a hose line. He was equipped with full turnout gear and an SCBA but was not equipped with a PASS device. It is believed that he tripped over a coffee table and became entangled in a couch. He removed his SCBA to call for help and was overcome by extremely heavy heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters on the scene attempted a rescue but were driven back by intense heat and flames and finally by the collapse of the house's roof. Firefighter Gouckenour's body was found approximately ten feet inside the front door of the structure. The cause of death was asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide. Firefighter Gouckenour joined the fire department after his home burned two years previous to his death.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should implement an incident command system (ICS) with written standard operating procedures for all fire fighters and ensure all fire fighters are trained on the system. Fire departments should ensure that command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operation at an incident. Fire departments should ensure at least four fire fighters are on the scene before initiating interior fire fighting operations at a working structure fire. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear and use Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices when involved in fire fighting, rescue, and other hazardous duties. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, be equipped with two-way communications with incident command. Fire departments should ensure automatic aid is established when known water pressure problems exist.

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Toomey, Tracy Dolan

Age: 52
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Oakland Fire Department, Oakland. Calif.
Status: Career
Incident date: 01/10/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 4
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 5+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 25+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: Nightclub
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Internal trauma
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 01/10/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Toomey was crushed and killed when the second floor of a turn of the century residential structure collapsed into the first floor. The fire eventually went to six alarms. A total of four firefighters were trapped by the collapse, including Firefighter Toomey.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire fighters should use extreme caution and recognize potential hazards that could exist when fighting a fire in a balloon-framed structure. Fire departments should implement an emergency notification system to rapidly warn all persons who might be in danger if an imminent hazard is identified or if a change in strategy is made. Fire Departments should ensure that fire fighters wear protective clothing whenever they are exposed or potentially exposed to hazards. Fire departments should ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed. Fire departments should ensure that when fire fighters are performing an interior attack with the possibility of a ceiling collapse, they should attempt to establish a collapse shelter. Fire departments should provide the Incident Commander with a Command Aide. Fire Departments should ensure that once a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established that they remain the RIT throughout the operation. Fire departments should develop and implement a preventative maintenance program to ensure that all SCBA�s are adequately maintained. Building owners should ensure that all modifications/renovations to buildings are in compliance with current building codes (i.e., any renovation or remodeling does not decrease the structural integrity of supporting members).

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Matthews, Louis Jefferson

Age: 29
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: District of Columbia Fire Department ,Washington, D.C.
Status: Career
Incident date: 05/30/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 12
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 15+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: townhouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 05/30/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Firefighter Matthews and Firefighter Phillips were members of two different engine companies working on the first floor of a townhouse that was experiencing a fire. Both crews had entered the front door of the townhouse at street level. The fire was confined to the basement. The basement, at grade at the rear of the structure, was opened by a truck company and a small fire was observed. A company officer at the basement door requested permission to hit the fire but his request was denied by the incident commander since he knew that crews were in the building and he did not want to have an opposing hose stream situation. The fire grew rapidly and extended up the basement stairs into the living areas of the townhouse where Firefighter Matthews, Firefighter Phillips, and other firefighters were working. With the exception of Firefighter Matthews and Firefighter Phillips, all firefighters exited the building after the progress of the fire made the living area of the townhouse untenable. On the exterior of the building, firefighters realized that Firefighter Matthews was not accounted for. Firefighters reentered the building and followed the sound of a PASS device. They removed the firefighter with the activated PASS to the exterior of the building. Once outside, firefighters realized that the firefighter that had been rescued was not Firefighter Matthews but was in fact Firefighter Phillips. The search continued and Firefighter Matthews was discovered and removed approximately four minutes later. Firefighter Phillips' PASS device was of the type that is automatically activated when the SCBA is activated and it worked properly. Firefighter Matthews' PASS was a manually activated type and it was found in the off position. Both firefighters received immediate medical care on the scene and were rapidly transported to hospitals. Firefighter Phillips was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital and Firefighter Matthews died the following day on May 31, 1999. Firefighter Phillips died as the result of burns over 60% of his body surface area and his airway. Firefighter Matthews died as the result of burns over 90% of his body surface area and his airway. Two other firefighters were injured fighting the fire. One of these two firefighters, who suffered burns over 60% of his body surface area, survived and was released from the hospital in late August. At the time of his release, it was not clear if this firefighter would ever return to work.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that the department�s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are followed and refresher training is provided. Fire departments should consider providing the Incident Commander with a Command Aide. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts. Fire departments should ensure that when a piece of equipment is taken out of service, appropriate backup equipment is identified and readily available. Fire departments should ensure that personnel equipped with a radio position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions. Fire departments should consider using a radio communication system that is equipped with an emergency signal button, is reliable, and does not produce interference. Fire departments should ensure that all companies responding are aware of any follow-up reports from dispatch. Fire departments should ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival. Fire departments should ensure that any hose line taken into the structure remains inside until all crews have exited. Fire departments should consider providing all fire fighters with a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. Fire departments should develop and implement a preventive maintenance program to ensure that all SCBA�s are adequately maintained.

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Phillips, Anthony Sean

Age: 30
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: District of Columbia Fire Department, Washington, D.C.
Status: Career
Incident date: 05/30/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 12
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 15+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: townhouse
Cause of death: Exposure
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 05/30/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Brotherton, Paul Arthur

Age: 41
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Worcester Fire Department, Worcester, Mass.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/03/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 28+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 28+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/03/99
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: Members of the Worcester Fire Department responded to a fire in the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse. The building was a windowless six story structure. Upon arrival at the scene, firefighters found a large warehouse with light smoke conditions and a fire on the second floor. Search and rescue and fire attack operations were initiated. Within seconds, conditions in the fire building changed and thick black smoke reduced visibility to zero. All Fire Department personnel were ordered down from upper floors and a head count was taken. The head count revealed that two firefighters were not accounted for. A Mayday radio transmission was received from Firefighter Brotherton indicating that he and Firefighter Lucey, both of Rescue One, were lost and running out of air. A search for the trapped firefighters was initiated with eighteen firefighters searching for the two that were lost. Lieutenant Spencer, Firefighter Jackson, Firefighter McGuirk, and Firefighter Lyons entered the fifth floor to conduct a search. Contact with the team was lost and all six firefighters perished. The cause of the fire is believed to be accidental, the result of a knocked over candle during a domestic dispute by some transients living in the building. The transients were charged with manslaughter for failing to report the fire.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that inspections of vacant buildings and pre-fire planning are conducted which cover all potential hazards, structural building materials (type and age), and renovations that may be encountered during a fire, so that the Incident Commander will have the necessary structural information to make informed decisions and implement an appropriate plan of attack. Fire Departments should ensure that the incident command system is fully implemented at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed when activities, size of fire, or need occurs such as during multiple-alarm fires, or responds automatically to pre-designated fires. Fire departments should ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-alarm fires. Fire departments should ensure that Incident Command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should use guide ropes/tag lines securely attached to permanent objects at entry portals and place high-intensity floodlights at entry portals to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency escape. Fire departments should ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position upon arrival. Implement an overall health and safety program such as the one recommended in NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program. Fire departments should consider using a marking system when conducting searches. Fire departments should identify dangerous vacant buildings by affixing warning placards to entrance doorways or other openings where fire fighters may enter. Fire departments should ensure that officers enforce and fire fighters follow the mandatory mask rule per administrative guidelines established by the department. Fire departments should explore the use of thermal imaging cameras to locate lost or downed fire fighters and civilians in fire environments. Manufacturers and research organizations should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters on the fireground.

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Jackson, Timothy P.

Age: 51
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Worcester Fire Department, Worcester, Mass.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/03/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 28+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 28+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/03/99
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Lucey, Jeremiah M

Age: 38
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Worcester Fire Department, Worcester, Mass.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/03/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 28+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 28+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/03/99
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Lyons, James F

Age: 34
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Worcester Fire Department, Worcester, Mass.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/03/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 28+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 28+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/03/99
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

McGuirk, Joseph T

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Spencer, Thomas Edward

Age: 42
Sex: Male
Rank: Lieutenant
Department: Worcester Fire Department, Worcester, Mass.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/03/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 3
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 28+
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 28+
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/03/99
Property type: Vacant Property

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Tvedten, John H

Age: 47
Sex: Male
Rank: Battalion Chief

Kansas City Fire Department, Kansas City, Mo.
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/18/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 6
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 27
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: paper warehouse
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Incident command
Death date: 12/18/99
Property type: Manufacturing

Summary by USFA: Chief Tvedten was a sector officer working inside of a warehouse that was involved in fire. Visibility in the warehouse was good and firefighters were putting water on the fire. About 45 minutes into the incident, interior conditions changed rapidly as thick black smoke enveloped the building. Command ordered the building to be evacuated and Chief Tvedten ordered firefighters to leave, the emergency evacuation signal was given over radios and by fire apparatus air horns at the scene. During the evacuation, Chief Tvedten became disoriented and lost. Chief Tvedten was in radio communication with Command. Six search teams swept the building but were not able to locate Chief Tvedten until it was too late.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that the department�s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are followed and refresher training is provided. Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters performing fire fighting operations are accounted for. Fire departments should ensure that proper ventilation equipment is available and ventilation takes place when fire fighters are operating inside smoke-filled structures. Fire departments should ensure that one of the first-arriving engines be assigned to pump water into the building�s fire department sprinkler connection to reinforce the automatic sprinkler system. Fire departments should ensure that when entering or exiting a smoke-filled structure, fire fighters follow a hoseline, rope, or some other type of guide. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are equipped with a radio that does not bleedover, cause interference, or lose communication under field conditions. Fire departments should ensure that when fire fighters suspect that they have been exposed to carbon monoxide, they notify their officer or the IC and receive the proper medical care. Fire departments should ensure that a rehabilitation area is designated when needed. Fire departments should ensure that the assigned Rapid Intervention Team(s) (RIT) complete search and rescue operations and are properly trained and equipped. Fire departments should ensure consistent use of Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices at all incidents and consider providing fire fighters with a PASS integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. Fire departments should develop and implement a preventative maintenance program to ensure that all SCBAs are adequately maintained. Building owners, supervisory staff, or employees should ensure that fires are reported to the fire department immediately.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Bitting, Jason L

Age: 29
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Keokuk Fire Department, Keokuk, Iowa
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/22/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 4
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 6
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: duplex
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Burns
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/22/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: The Keokuk Fire Department was dispatched to a fire in a residential structure. The structure was a house built in 1910 that had been divided into three apartments. The Department responded with an engine, a quint, and a Chief's vehicle with a total of three Firefighters, a Lieutenant, an Assistant Chief, and the Fire Chief. The response of the Chief and one Firefighter was delayed since they were returning from a previous incident. Up arrival, Assistant Chief McNally, Firefighter Bitting, and Firefighter Tuck entered the building in full turnouts and SCBA for search and rescue. A mother and child were trapped on the roof above the porch and three other children were trapped inside. Firefighters rescued one infant child that was transported to the hospital by a police officer. Firefighters rescued a second infant child that was transported to the hospital by a police Captain and the Fire Chief, the Fire Chief was away from the scene for approximately three minutes. Firefighters were searching for the third child when a flashover occurred and trapped all three. An aggressive fire attack was mounted by firefighters that were arriving due to a callback of off-duty members but the effort was not able to save the lives of the three firefighters. All three firefighters were wearing PASS devices that were integrated with their SCBAs. The PASS devices failed to sound an alarm when the firefighters became incapacitated. The Fire Chief does not believe that the failure of the PASS devices contributed to the deaths. The SCBAs and PASS devices are undergoing testing to determine why they did not operate. Assistant Chief McNally was found on the second floor at the top of the stairs with the third child. The cause of death was listed as smoke inhalation and exposure to extreme heat. Chief McNally's carboxyhemoglobin level was 15%. Firefighter Bitting was found in the front bedroom on the second floor of the apartment. The cause of death was listed as exposure to intense heat. Firefighter Bitting's carboxyhemoglobin level was 1%. Firefighter Tuck was found on the first floor of the apartment in the living room area. The cause of death was listed as smoke inhalation and exposure to heat. Firefighter Tuck's carboxyhemoglobin level was 25%. In addition to the three firefighters killed in this incident, the two infant children and a seven year old child perished. The fire was caused by activation of a stove burner by a child. Two high chair trays that were stored on top of the stove were the initial objects involved in the fire. Smoke detectors in the home did not operate.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents. Fire departments should ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident. Fire departments should ensure fire fighters are trained in the tactics of defensive search. Fire departments should ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene. Fire departments should ensure that fireground communication is present through both the use of portable radios and face-to-face communications. Fire departments should ensure that a trained Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear and use PASS devices when involved in interior fire fighting and other hazardous duties.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

McNally, Dave M

Age: 48
Sex: Male
Rank: Assistant Chief
Department:

Keokuk Fire Department, Keokuk, Iowa
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/22/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 4
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 6
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: duplex
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/22/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Tuck, Nathan R

Age: 39
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Keokuk Fire Department, Keokuk, Iowa
Status: Career
Incident date: 12/22/99
Minutes to first responder arriving: 6
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 4
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 6
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: Yes
Anyone in fact inside to save: Yes
Type of building: duplex
Cause of death: Caught or trapped
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Search and rescue
Death date: 12/22/99
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: (See above)

NIOSH recommendations: (See above)

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Gass, Walter Harvey

Age: 74
Sex: Male
Rank: Captain
Department: Sealy Volunteer Fire Department, Sealy, Texas
Status: Volunteer
Incident date: 01/27/00
Minutes to first responder arriving: 2
Firefighters arriving within 6 minutes (suggested 4 on an engine or ladder): 2
Firefighters arriving within 10 minutes (suggested 15): 10
Any possible indication of anyone inside to save: No
Anyone in fact inside to save: No
Type of building: single-family home
Cause of death: Exposure
Nature of death: Asphyxiation
Activity: Advancing Hose Lines / Fire Attack
Death date: 01/27/00
Property type: Residential

Summary by USFA: Captain Gass and other members of his department were dispatched to a residential structure fire that was caused when lightning struck a house. The first two firefighters on the scene, the Assistant Chief and the Fire Chief, confirmed a working fire with dark smoke and fire visible from the attic and dormers. Captain Gass and his crew were the first fire company to arrive at the scene. Captain Gass and two firefighters entered the structure through the front door to perform an aggressive attack on the fire. Shortly after entering the structure, the two firefighters who were with Captain Gass were attempting to feed more hose into the structure. There was a rapid buildup of heat and the hoseline seemed to drop. The firefighters exited the building and reported this situation to the Chief. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) were formed and, after four attempts, the second team was successful in recovering Captain Gass. Captain Gass was equipped with full structural protective clothing and a manually activated PASS device. The PASS was found in the "off" position. Captain Gass was located about 18 feet inside the front door of the structure. Captain Gass was removed from the structure approximately 20 minutes after his arrival on the scene. The cause of death was listed as smoke and soot inhalation with greater than 80 percent total thermal injury.

NIOSH recommendations: Fire departments should ensure that the department�s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are in place and refresher training is provided. Fire departments should ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts.

Click here for the NIOSH investigative report

Mayo, Lewis Evans III

Age: 44
Sex: Male
Rank: Firefighter
Department: Houston Fire Department, Houston, Texas
Status: Career
Incident date: 02/14/00
Minutes to first responder arriving: 5
Firef