Range of agencies monitor job
Amid calls for more oversight on the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project, state officials respond that there are already more than a dozen agencies examining the project's fiscal and management actions. However, some of those are only nominally overseeing the project. Below is a sampling of the findings of the agencies that have issued reports.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Several staff members at Department of Environmental Protection oversee compliance with environmental laws, conduct ongoing review. Staff analyst funded by project.
1994: Issued notice of noncompliance on dirt processing at Spectacle Island. Problem corrected.
OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR
Monitors virtually all activities. Six staff members on site at project.
1993: Criticized management of Charles River crossing element, alleging unnecessary cost of $23 million.
1994: Criticized lack of dirt-disposal plan, alleging unnecessary cost of $7 million.
1994: Criticized inadequate coordination of construction at Third Harbor Tunnel connection to Logan Airport, alleging unnecessary costs of $11 million that could reach $30 million.
STATE INSPECTOR GENERAL
Central Artery/Tunnel project pays $300,000 for fiscal year 1995 for project oversight.
1991: Issued report concluding that the process awarding two two-year, $400,000 audit contracts to private firms was unfair and unnecessarily costly.
1993: Issued report concluding plan to build multimillion-dollar Operations Control Center Complex was ill-conceived and wasteful.
1994: Issued report concluding that inefficient audit processes, delays and insufficient staff imperils federal fund reimbursement and increases the state's share of the project.
1994: Wrote to state charging private management consultant failed to see need for odor-control at disposal site on Governor's Island, leading to $414,000, no-bid contract addition.
1994: Reviewed project's "Resident Engineers Manual" and concluded engineers lack guidance to oversee contracts valued in excess of $1 billion; found section on how to handle contract changes missing, though 1,000 contract changes worth more than $100 million were pending or had been approved.
1994: Criticized a construction contract that increased from $20.5 million to $32 million, with more changes pending that could bring the total to twice the original value.
1994: Criticized the project for violating state law by hiring a sub- consultant without bids and paying or committing to pay $20 million; said project managers were unaware of the law.
LEGISLATIVE HOUSE POST AUDIT & OVERSIGHT
Oversees all activities involving state funds, does ongoing review.
1994: Disagreed with project officials' claim that it is closely overseen by multiple agencies, charging much of the oversight is deficient and most agencies have nominal or limited roles in monitoring; criticized inherent conflict in which principal management contractor often oversees its own work; criticized up to $45,000 in relocation expenses per management consultant employee, for a total of $1.5 million in 1991-93.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE
Oversees all project activities, funding being approximately 85 percent federal overall. Does ongoing review.
1993: Report on "value engineering" concluded that although project saved about $400 million an additional $100 million might have been saved if local Federal Highway Administration office and state acted more effectively.
1994: Concluded to US Secretary of Transportation that estimated cost has more than tripled from $2.3 billion in 1984 to $7.7 billion in 1994, that there is no firm completion date, and that future project funding is
uncertain.
1994: Issued preliminary findings that regional Federal Highway Administration's oversight and administration of right-of-way acquisition were not sufficient to prevent needless acquisition of two buildings -- Anelex and Wang -- causing unnecessary costs of $25 million.
