Hussein-era arms linked to fatalities

WASHINGTON -- A newly declassified government report says that half of American troop deaths in Iraq have been caused by explosives left over from Saddam Hussein's regime and that even four years after the war began the US military has failed to conduct an adequate inventory of Hussein's weapons depots.

The assessment by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found that Iraq remains awash in unsecured mortar rounds, shells, and grenades left over from the former regime and that "the looted munitions will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the region."

In one case, insurgents repeatedly stole explosives from a well-known depot while the Iraqi government was supposed to be disposing of the arms, according to the report, which was written in December and based on field reports and secret intelligence.

The report, released yesterday by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, also said the original US war plan designated the defeated Iraqi Army to secure the weapons depots. But that strategy fell apart when the Bush administration unexpectedly decided to disband the Iraqi military, leaving an undermanned US military force to take on the task.

"The human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to provide sufficient troops have been high, with [improvised explosives] made with looted munitions causing about half of all US combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis," the report said.

US intelligence overreached in declaring that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, but it underestimated the number of conventional weapons in Iraq, according to the report. Hussein's government stockpiled hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional munitions, defined as explosive devices, propellants, and pyrotechnics, for use in military operations.

In early 2004, the US military reviewed 401 of the unknown number of ammunition facilities across Iraq to assess their vulnerability to theft. But only a few of the largest sites were considered vulnerable enough to be guarded by US troops. The majority of the sites were left unprotected even though they still contained munitions.

In Pentagon documents reviewed by the GAO, however, commanders blamed a lack of troops for their inability to guard the sites.

Much of Iraq's Hussein-era firepower remains unsecured, the report said.

"Insurgents and militia have continued to exploit former regime depots," the report said. "Insurgents appear to have continuing access to some sites over extended periods, even sites earmarked for demolition."

With the demands of policing sectarian violence, however, US and Iraqi troops may not be able to gain control over the supply of weapons any time soon. Pentagon officials told GAO investigators that even performing a "theater-wide" risk assessment of conventional munitions supplies "is not feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq or the region."

The findings drew the ire of congressional Democrats.

"It concerns me greatly that four years into the war, we still can't be confident these munitions are secured," said Representative Adam Schiff , a California Democrat and a member of the House International Relations Committee. "What's even more disturbing is the response by the [Defense Department], which is that it would be a good thing to do but would draw manpower away from other operations. That is an indication of how stretched our forces are."

Representative John F. Tierney, Democrat of Salem and chairman of the subcommittee that released the report, blamed the administration for "the dangerously naïve assumptions imposed by top civilian leadership upon our troops."

The Pentagon has spent billions of dollars trying to combat IEDs, commonly known as roadside bombs. In late 2003, the Defense Department created a special office charged with finding new ways to protect the troops against such bombs. President Bush requested $6.4 billion in additional funds for the IED office in his budget request in February, nearly double what has been spent so far.

But the GAO report said the administration has failed to address the need to secure the explosives at their source, before they fall into the hands of insurgents or rogue militias.

The Pentagon responded to the report's findings by saying it would "determine the feasibility" of conducting a more thorough survey of munitions sites in Iraq, but cautioned against dictating to commanders in the field how they should use their resources.

"Commanders are clearly aware of the danger these munitions pose to operations . . . and are mitigating that threat as they are able," Victor A. D. Rostow, a top Pentagon official, told investigators in a letter.

To independent military specialists, however, the continuing threat from Iraqi munitions stockpiles underscored the failures of prewar planning.

"It really is astonishing," said Charles Heyman , a London-based defense analyst. "It is all a result of the initial planning of the war. There were never ever, ever enough troops. In about 10 to 20 years time this will be described as one of the worst-managed campaigns in modern history."

Bryan Bender can be reached at bender@globe.com.