General offers lessons learned by Soviet Union in Afghanistan

MOSCOW - Retired Lieutenant General Ruslan Aushev, 54, served for five years in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union's nearly decade-long battle with mujahideen there. He was wounded and named a hero of the Soviet Union.

Aushev, who later served as president of the Caucasus republic of Ingushetia, is now chief of the Committee of Afghan Veterans.

In his Moscow office recently, he talked about the lessons learned from the 1980s war in Afghanistan, and what those lessons suggest as the US military enters the eighth year of conflict in Central Asia.

Q. In its invasion of Afghanistan, do you believe the United States benefited from the Soviet experience? Do you see any evidence of your lessons from the Soviet defeat?

A. I can tell you which mistakes you made and which mistakes we made. They are the same mistakes. We set up a very weak leader, Babrak Karmal. He didn't have prestige with the people. Today the leadership of Afghanistan does not enjoy popularity with the people.

They said of Babrak Karmal, he only sits there with the help of Russian bayonets. We said, "Afghans, you are living according to the Soviet way of life, where religion is separated from the state, mullahs should be expelled, religion is the opiate of the people. . . . The Soviet way of life in the country that still lives in the Dark Ages!

And what did [the United States] say? You said, "We are giving you democracy." They cannot even translate the term properly.

Under us there was a lot of corruption, and today there's a lot of corruption.

Q. At the height of the Soviet war, there were more than twice as many Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan as there are US and allied soldiers in the country today. Do you believe the United States should increase the level of troops in Afghanistan?

A. You can expand your presence, but what will change? I think you need to do three things. First, create statehood. Set up a popular authority that would deal with corruption and social issues. Second, a combat-able armed force should be created in Afghanistan. And [third] an economy should be created to help people. If you deploy 200,000 troops there, daytime is your time, you're in command. At night, the Taliban comes and they are in command.

Q. The US finds itself propping up a relatively unpopular government against attacks from a radicalized Muslim population. . . . What advice would you give to American commanders on the ground?

A. No matter what, you won't get away from the Taliban. You need to talk with the Taliban, come to terms. The Taliban should be engaged by the organs of power. They should take part in negotiations.

Q. So you think the US should explore negotiations with the more moderate elements of the Taliban?

A. Of course they should. You understand, you are dealing with an idea. If an idea exists, you should sit down and think why, and what to do with it. That's why the Soviet Union broke down, not because it was bombed out of existence, but because private ownership of means of production won the day.

Q. At this point, what do you believe would constitute a victory for American forces in Afghanistan? Under what conditions could the US leave Afghanistan?

A. Let me put it this way: Seven years is a long time. We began to talk about troop withdrawal in 1985, six years after the invasion.

In 1986, exactly seven years after the invasion, we began to pull out some troops. But we were reinforcing the authorities in Afghanistan. When we were there, the Afghan army was more or less combat-ready. And there were officials, officers and generals who were educated in the Soviet Union.

Q. What's your assessment of Afghan leader Hamid Karzai?

A. I don't know him. I know one thing: He failed as president. If he's protected by American special forces, then how do people react to this president?