Can the US help Iraqis save a nation? Answers are elusive
Recommendations from the Iraq Study Group focus on three main components: shifting US troops to a training role and gradually withdrawal of most combat brigades; inviting Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to help stabilize the country; and reducing support for Iraq's government if it does not make progress toward political reconciliation. Here is a look at the key factors that will determine whether those goals can be achieved.
Q. The report calls for accelerating the hand-over of security to Iraqis, pulling out most US combat forces by 2008. Can the Iraqis take over more quickly?
A. The US military has made it a priority for more than a year to speed the hand-over of primary security responsibility to Iraqi troops. But military academies set up by the United States have turned out officers of uneven quality, and the few effective Iraqi units have tended to represent a single ethnic group, perpetuating the ethnic and sectarian strife.
Iraq's new police force has been infiltrated by militias and implicated in death squads. Elements of Iraq's army have refused to carry out missions outside their home areas. Two out of 18 provinces have already been turned over to Iraqis. Roughly a third of Iraq's security forces are now controlled by Iraqis. But security has often deteriorated in areas that have been handed over, forcing the United States to send troops back in -- including in many parts of Baghdad.
Q. The report calls for the United States to engage all of Iraq's neighbors -- including Iran and Syria -- in the effort to stabilize Iraq, a step. How could Iran and Syria improve the situation in Iraq, and why has the Bush administration so far resisted direct negotiations with the two nations?
A. Both Syria and Iran say they have an interest in preventing Iraq from descending into chaos because of the growing number of refugees fleeing Iraq and the possibility that war could spread. Both have deep cultural and financial ties with Iraq's leaders, and could encourage them to make political concessions. Syria and Iran could also better patrol their porous borders to keep foreign fighters out, cut off funding sources for violent activities, and use their active intelligence networks in Iraq to ease the violence.
Washington has long taken a hard-line against these two countries, accusing them of funding terrorism and instability across the Middle East. US officials say enlisting help from Iran and Syria now would cost them too high a price as the Bush administration continues pressuring Iran over its nuclear program and Syria for its interference in Lebanon.
Q. The Study Group called for a "diplomatic offensive" to get Iraq's neighbors to cooperate on its security, including the formation of a "Support Group" that includes all of Iraq's neighbors to help bolster Iraq's government. What could such a regional group accomplish?
A. Iraq's government is already talking to Syria, recently re-establishing relations after a 24-year freeze. Baghdad and Tehran have very close relations, and their leaders meet regularly. Regional summits have already been convened focusing on financial support for Iraq.
A new group could push Iraq's neighbors to throw their support behind the government rather than the various factions they now support. But it would not necessarily change the dynamic unless Washington can convince these neighbors that it is in their interests to do so, an outcome that would likely require concessions to Syria and Iran.
Q. The Study Group recommended reducing US financial and political aid to Iraq's government if it fails to reach a political agreement that could help quell the sectarian violence. What are Iraq's factions fighting over, and could such a US threat push them to agree?
A. Iraq's rival groups _ the Kurds, Shi'ite Arabs, and Sunni Arabs _ cannot agree on a formula to share government power or Iraq's oil wealth, which is located in the Shi'ite and Kurdish parts of the country. Mistrust between the groups is high and plays out in sectarian killings and even so-called ethnic cleansing. Shi'ites and Sunnis, in particular, might not be willing to make political compromises until they've fought each other enough to gauge their relative strength.
A US threat to withdraw financial, political, and military support could force some parties to make political concessions for peace. But there is also a risk that anti-American factions, such as the bloc led by firebrand Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, would try to block any political agreement and reconciliation in order to force the United States out.
Q. The Study Group's main aim is to try to lessen the violence in Iraq. What are the prospects for quelling the strife?
A. Many analysts believe that only an Iraqi political settlement would curb the killings, much of which stems from tit-for-tat violence between militias controlled by Shi'ite Islamist parties and Sunni insurgent groups. But it is unclear what impact a political agreement would have on these groups. Sadr's militia, for example, has a track record of making _ and then breaking _ deals with the government.
Compiled by Globe staff members Farah Stockman in Washington, D.C., and Thanassis Cambanis in Jerusalem. 