Israel's long-term goal unclear

Some see attempt to remove Hamas

An Israeli Army mortar crew waited for orders yesterday at Erez Crossing on the Israeli side of the Gaza Strip border. (Patrick Baz/ AFP/ Getty Images)

EREZ CROSSING, on the Israel-Gaza border - As Israel's tanks and troops poured into Gaza yesterday, the next phase in its fierce attempt to end rocket attacks, a question hung over the operation: Can the rockets really be stopped for any length of time while Hamas remains in power in Gaza?

And if the answer is determined to be no, then is the real aim of the operation to remove Hamas entirely, no matter the cost?

After her visit to Paris Thursday to explain to French authorities why she thought this was not the time for a quick cease-fire, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni of Israel said, "There is no doubt that as long as Hamas controls Gaza, it is a problem for Israel, a problem for the Palestinians, and a problem for the entire region."

Vice Premier Haim Ramon went further Friday night in an interview on Israeli television, saying Israel must not end this operation with Hamas in charge of Gaza.

"What I think we need to do is to reach a situation in which we do not allow Hamas to govern," Ramon said on Channel One. "That is the most important thing."

Neither Prime Minister Ehud Olmert nor Defense Minister Ehud Barak has made such a statement. Barak showed himself open to a French suggestion last week for a 48-hour cease-fire aimed at injecting humanitarian aid into Gaza and exploring the possibility of a real truce.

Still, there is a growing and shared concern among Israeli leaders that any letup against Hamas would be problematic for Israel's broad goals in the long term because it could bolster and validate the group, which says Israel should be destroyed.

"If the war ends in a draw, as expected, and Israel refrains from reoccupying Gaza, Hamas will gain diplomatic recognition," wrote Aluf Benn, a political analyst, in the newspaper Haaretz.

In addition, any truce would probably include an increase in commercial traffic from Israel and Egypt into Gaza, which is Hamas's central demand: to end the economic boycott and border closing it has been facing. To build up the Gaza economy under Hamas, Israeli leaders say, would be to build up Hamas. But withholding the commerce would continue to leave 1.5 million Gazans in despair.

Implicit in Benn's contention is that the only way to stop Hamas from gaining legitimacy was for Israel to occupy Gaza again, more than three years after removing its soldiers and settlers. That is a prospect practically no one in Israel or abroad is advocating.

Moreover, almost no one familiar with Gaza and Palestinian politics considers it realistic to remove Hamas from power. Hamas legislators won a democratic majority in elections four years ago, and the group has 15,000 to 20,000 men under arms. It has consolidated its rule in the past 18 months since pushing out rivals loyal to the more moderate Fatah party of the West Bank.

And while there are plenty of Gazans who would prefer Fatah, they do not seem organized or strong enough to become the new rulers, even with the help of former colleagues in exile in Ramallah who say that they would never be willing to ride into Gaza on the back of an Israeli tank. The longer Israel pounds Gaza, the weaker Fatah is likely to become because it will be seen as collaborating.

The likelier result of a destruction of the Hamas infrastructure would be chaos, anathema not only to the people of Gaza but also to those hoping for peace in southern Israel.

There has been broad international criticism of this war on Gaza, not only because of the suffering seen on television screens but because of a feeling that Israel has tried such tactics in the past and never succeeded.

Many point to the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, in which Israel also tried to destroy rocket launchers and a hostile organization's infrastructure, only to end up killing many civilians and leaving Hezbollah more popular and perhaps stronger.

But military planners here say the parallel is inexact and that they have learned a lesson. Gaza is smaller and flatter than southern Lebanon, and it does not have a sievelike border with a country like Syria where arms can be continuously resupplied.

Destroying smuggler tunnels from the Egyptian Sinai into Gaza and systematically taking out weapons depots and launcher sites, along with their supporting infrastructures, will ultimately succeed, they contend.

It might take weeks or months, they assert, but it can work. If true, the questions still remain: At what human cost? And who will be in charge when it is over?