Top of NFL draft a numbers game

Once the pick of the litter, the top of the draft is now a numbers game

When it comes to the NFL draft, life at the top has never been so counterproductive. The Miami Dolphins provided another reminder earlier this week.

Owners of the top pick in this weekend's draft, the Dolphins took what many observers felt was the safest path when they negotiated a deal in advance with Jake Long, an offensive lineman from Michigan.

Long signed a five-year, $57 million deal that makes him the highest-paid offensive lineman in the NFL, and he hasn't played a down yet.

Long could be a pillar of the Dolphins' offensive line for years, the type of hard-working player to build around. Then again, he could struggle to adapt to the pro game and never make the impact expected of top draft choices.

The only certainty, it seems, is that Long will never be considered a bargain.

Not too long ago, finances weren't much of a consideration for teams picking at the top of the draft. Being at the top was considered valuable, because it ensured a needy team would land a blue-chip player.

How times have changed.

As salaries for top choices continue to escalate and teams are annually reminded of the inexact science of the draft, many are altering their views of how valuable a high draft pick is.

A few years ago, the Chargers turned the No. 1 pick into a bushel of selections, yet it's not too hard to imagine a scenario down the road where the first pick could go straight-up for a middle spot in the first round. Seemingly more teams are creating a new formula that is driving their decision-making process, which incorporates a balance between football scouting and economic principles.

It reads something like this:

Uncertainty of the selection process + economic risk = true value.

Topsy-turvy

For years, many teams have used a points chart to determine the value of each draft pick. The top pick had the highest total because it ensured a club would get the best player.

Yet more and more clubs are now altering their charts, so No. 1 is no longer No. 1.

"Based on the economics of the first pick, and the first few picks, I don't know [if the old chart] represents the accurate value, with the highest value being the highest pick," Dolphins vice president Bill Parcells said. "I'm of the opinion that the cost is a deterrent. We've put a lesser value on that."

Although Tampa Bay Buccaneers general manager Bruce Allen noted that his club does not utilize a point chart, he echoed Parcells's thoughts.

"If people are relying on that [chart], they're probably going to have a tough time [trading]," he said.

They are words spoken in many NFL cities, and explain, in part, why there have been no trades in the draft's top 10 since 2004.

Few teams, it seems, are putting a high value on those top picks, with more clubs placing the top value of the first round from Nos. 11-32. More teams also are discovering it is better business to accumulate more draft choices in the second or middle rounds, because the economic risk is limited and it's still possible to land a quality player (i.e. Asante Samuel, fourth round).

Indianapolis Colts general manager Bill Polian has been one of the most vocal critics of the system, saying the draft's true purpose - to help teams that need it most - is no longer being served. Especially at No. 1.

"If you fail with that pick, your franchise is saddled with an albatross that you can't get rid of for who knows how long," he said. "It's completely changed because of the cost of those picks and in my view, that's wrong."

In the end, that probably best explains why the Dolphins targeted Michigan offensive lineman Jake Long as the top pick in this year's draft. Based on the opinion of several scouts, Long isn't the draft's best player, but he qualifies as one of the safest selections.

So with no acceptable trade offers for the top pick, the Dolphins took advantage of an NFL rule that allows teams with the No. 1 selection to negotiate with prospects before the draft, and finalized a five-year, $57 million deal with Long that includes $30 million in bonuses and guarantees.

Long immediately becomes the league's highest-paid offensive lineman. The payouts to other top picks are also skyrocketing, again reflecting why fewer teams are interested in acquiring those selections.

"The contracts the first five, six, seven guys get, they could very well be the worst deal in football," said former Tennessee Titans general manager Floyd Reese, now an analyst for ESPN. "People say, 'What about teams which overpay in free agency?' But the difference to me is that at least you're paying a guy who you've seen play in the NFL vs. a guy you're hoping can play in the NFL."

Guaranteed problems

Although they have certainly been aware of the financial implications of a top-10 pick, the Patriots have not been directly affected since 2001, when they selected defensive lineman Richard Seymour sixth overall.

This year, the Patriots have the seventh pick, courtesy of a trade with the San Francisco 49ers.

How have things changed financially since 2001?

Seymour's initial contract was a six-year pact worth approximately $14.3 million. The deal included a $4.8 million signing bonus and approximately $3 million in guarantees, which was considered high, but not over the top.

Last year's No. 6 pick, Redskins safety LaRon Landry, inked a five-year, $41.5 million pact that included $17.5 million in bonuses and guarantees.

To put this in perspective, the salary cap has increased 73 percent since 2001, while the bonuses and guarantees for the No. 6 selection increased 119 percent.

Based on inflation, the Patriots planned their offseason budget accordingly, realizing if they make a selection at No. 7 they must be prepared to pay about $18 million in bonuses and guarantees.

That's about $2 million less than what they paid veteran free agent Adalius Thomas in bonuses and guarantees last offseason. At those figures, the top pick immediately becomes one of the top-five-paid players on the team, which can cause a strain among veterans in any locker room.

Carl Peterson, one of the NFL's longest-tenured general managers, said that is one reason he doesn't expect much interest from other clubs in the Chiefs' No. 5 pick.

"People shy away from those picks because those players are so expensive. You do all the research you can and do all your homework and spend a lot of time and a lot of money looking into these players, but mistakes are still made," he said earlier this month.

"I'm not holding my breath. We certainly will, as we do each year, contact the teams behind us to let them know we may be interested in moving back. But it's not that easy to get another team to agree to that. It's easier to do that in the middle to late part of the first round, but not early in the first round."

There is always the potential for an exception.

The New Orleans Saints have explored moving from No. 10 to No. 2 (Rams) or No. 3 (Falcons) in recent weeks.

For any team to make that jump, the target would be a specific player, someone deemed worthy of absorbing such financial risk. In the Saints' case, the player is presumed to be LSU defensive tackle Glenn Dorsey.

A quarterback such as Boston College's Matt Ryan would seemingly generate some value for a top-10 pick should he slide past No. 5.

Perhaps with that in mind, Allen disagreed with the premise that top draft choices are nearly impossible to trade. Most teams might not want them, but if they're auctioned at yard-sale rates, he believes there would be clubs lined up to grab them.

"If someone wants to trade the pick, we'll take it," he said.

View from above

Arguably, no one in the NFL has had such a unique view of the changes atop the draft than Parcells.

In 1993, his first year with the Patriots, the club utilized the first pick on quarterback Drew Bledsoe. When Parcells departed to the Jets in 1997, he once again had the top pick, yet in that instance he traded down twice - first to No. 6, then to No. 8.

Now in Miami, Parcells said the Dolphins would have considered a trade for No. 1 but teams were interested only "if there was a fire sale."

In going through the top-pick process for a third time, Parcells noted that cutting down the margin of error as much as possible is more imperative than ever.

"What has changed is the economic consequences of making a bad selection at this position," he said. "It's a disastrous effect on your franchise. It's a restrictive economic situation that you get yourself into by committing the vast number of dollars to one player, but it is the system, and it's the system we live with right now and ultimately, you have to participate."

The issue is expected to be addressed when owners and the players association negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement in the coming years. But for now, teams at the top of the draft - those with the worst record and in need of the most help - must accept the current conditions.

If they're fortunate, they receive some immediate bang for their buck, like the Browns last season with offensive lineman Joe Thomas (No. 3 pick, $23 million in guarantees).

Yet for every Thomas, there are players like receiver Troy Williamson, the seventh overall pick in 2005 who is no longer with the club that drafted him (Vikings).

That is why, more than ever, clubs are factoring economics into their decision-making, relying on a formula that weighs the uncertainty of the selection process with economic risk to determine true value.

The change in approach highlights how the top of the draft - once considered the promised land for needy clubs - is no longer as attractive.

"I think there is some reluctance in the league to attempt to go to the No. 1 pick because of economic consequences. I would even say picks in the top six or seven can have disastrous economic consequences that can set a franchise back for years," Parcells said. "We've seen that, and seen it recently."

Mike Reiss can be reached at mreiss@globe.com.