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BILL BELICHICK Low-percentage option |
Inside the game
GLENDALE, Ariz. - Bill Belichick and his coaching staff went against the grain in Super Bowl XLII.
The Patriots had advanced the ball to the Giants' 31 midway through the third quarter, gobbling up the clock on a 14-play march. Holding a 7-3 lead, and facing a fourth-and-13 situation, it was time to make a critical coaching decision.
The options seemed clear:
The percentages, according to the Elias Sports Bureau, indicate that Belichick and his staff should have sent kicker Stephen Gostkowski on to try a field goal.
NFL teams that went for it on fourth and 13 or longer this season were 4 of 22. There were three running plays and 19 passing plays - none of the runs made it and only four passes were successful. Overall, that's an 18.2 percent success rate.
On the flip side, kickers were 88 of 158 on field-goal attempts of that distance (approximately 47 yards) or longer, for a 55.7 success rate.
The Patriots went for it, and the play didn't have a chance.
Lined up with three receivers, a tight end and running back, hurried quarterback Tom Brady unloaded a long pass down the left sideline for Jabar Gaffney that sailed out of bounds. Incomplete.
Statistics aside, it was a puzzling choice given the route run by Gaffney, and Brady's decision on the low-percentage throw in his direction.
Belichick explained that there was thought given to the field goal, but he ultimately felt the kick was too long. In making that decision, he likely was factoring in Gostkowski's body of work this season, that his season-long field goal was 45 yards. Gostkowski had just one attempt from 48 yards or longer this season, a miss against the Steelers.
Perhaps Belichick didn't want to put his second-year kicker in such a pressure-packed situation. Maybe he was influenced by a botched second-quarter kickoff and didn't like the way Gostkowski - who had put his final pregame warmup attempt through from 53 - was striking the ball. Or maybe he didn't like the idea of the Giants getting the ball on the 38 if the kick was no good.
Belichick did not go into detail regarding the decision, which might not even be a topic of discussion today had the Patriots held on to win the game. But given the fact that they lost by 3 points, the against-the-grain decision was an obvious starting point for those analyzing the key areas in which the contest slipped away.
If there was one coaching decision that warranted second-guessing, this was it.
Those focusing on the coaching aspect also might question why the Patriots never found the answer to counter the Giants' relentless defensive pressure.
Should there have been more screen passes? More maximum protections? More tight end help against edge rushers Michael Strahan and Osi Umenyiora? Should receiver Donté Stallworth, who is dangerous running after the catch on short routes, have played more than Gaffney?
Certainly, the Patriots tried to tweak their plan as the game progressed; for example, they ran more plays with multiple tight ends in the second half after struggling to spread the field in the first half. But the decisions, and the execution, never got in synch.
Then there was the final scoring drive, the Patriots trailing, 10-7, facing first and goal from the Giants' 6. The clock showed 2:55 remaining, and the Giants had all three timeouts.
The Patriots went with a pass-pass-pass sequence, and while they scored the go-ahead touchdown on third down, they ate up just 13 seconds and allowed the Giants to keep their timeouts for their own last-minute heroics.
Did they make the right decision?
One line of thinking is that nothing is more important than scoring a touchdown at that point. That, since there is no guarantee of a score, a team should run its best plays regardless of the clock and the other team's timeout situation.
On the flip side, one might say it was the type of situational football the Patriots long have prided themselves on mastering. A running play on first down would have forced the Giants to make a decision with their timeouts. If they didn't use a timeout, one more play could have run the clock to the two-minute warning, leaving the Giants less time.
All told, those decisions were debatable.
But it was the choice to go for it on fourth and 13 that seemed most curious.
For Patriots coaches who are widely considered some of the best at what they do, and who eat, sleep, and drink X's and O's, it's a question that figures to linger deep into the offseason when they assess where Super Bowl XLII slipped away from them.
© Copyright 2008 Globe Newspaper Company.
